Trade union recognition law as an aid to freedom of association? by Crosby, RD
TRADE UNION RECOGNITION LAW 
AS AN AID TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION? 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT DAVID CROSBY 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of Nottingham Trent University 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
June 2016 
  
This work is the intellectual property of the author.  You may copy up to 5% of this work for 
private study, or personal, non-commercial research.  Any re-use of the information contained 
within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, university, degree 
level and pagination.  Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more substantial copy is 
required, should be directed to the owner(s) of the Intellectual Property Rights.  
  
CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         i 
 
 
TABLE OF CASES          ii 
 
 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION        iv 
 
 
ABSTRACT           1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION          2 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE  
THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN  
KAHN-FREUND’S THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS   4 
 
Introduction          4 
1.1 Kahn-Freund’s Theory Explored       5 
1.1.1 ‘Legal Abstentionsim’ and ‘Collective Laissez-Faire’    7 
1.1.2 Kahn-Freund’s Subsequent Embrace of ‘Interventionism’    12 
Summary          15 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
LEGAL UNDERPINNING OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN  
THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYMENT       19 
 
Introduction          19 
2.1 Components of Freedom of Assembly and Association    20 
2.1.1 The Significance of Freedom of Association in the Context of Employment 22 
2.2 European Freedom of Assembly and Association Rights    23 
2.2.1 Article 11 of the ECHR        24 
2.2.2 The Ruling in Demir and Baykara v Turkey      26 
2.2.3 The EU ‘Social Charter’ (or Social Chapter)      28 
2.3 The United Nations, Rights and the Promotion of Global Labour Standards 29 
2.3.1 The UN General Assembly’s ‘International Bill of Human Rights’   30 
2.3.2 The Work of the ILO         33 
2.3.3 ILO Provision for Freedom of Association and Trade Union Organisation  35 
2.4 Collective Bargaining and Collective Agreements     40 
2.5 Trade Unionism         43 
2.5.1 Trade Union Recognition        48 
Summary          49 
  
CHAPTER THREE  
THE EVOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LEGISLATION IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIOR TO 1997      52 
 
Introduction          52 
3.1 19th Century Origins of Worker Organisation     53 
3.1.1 The ‘Creation’ of Trade Unions in UK Law      55 
3.2 The Significance of the Post-Second World War Period,  
the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and Renewed Attempts at  
Control of Trade Union Activity       58 
3.2.1 The ‘Social Contract’         61 
3.2.2 Curbs on Trade Unions from the 1980s      64 
Summary          67 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNIONS IN AUSTRALIA    69 
 
Introduction          69 
4.1 Why Australia’s Model?        71 
4.2 20th Century Development of Australian Recognition Mechanisms   74 
4.3 Federal Labor’s ‘Third Way’ Approach (1983-96)     80 
4.4 Pro-Employer Legislation under ‘Howard Governments’    83 
4.5 ‘WorkChoices’         86 
4.5.1 From ‘WorkChoices’ to the Fair Work System     91 
Summary          98 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
THE ‘THIRD WAY’, ‘FAIRNESS AT WORK’ AND  
STATUTORY RECOGNITION IN THE UK FROM 1997    101 
 
Introduction          101 
5.1 The Context for Reform and ‘Third Way’ Thinking     103 
5.1.1 The Wilson and Palmer Cases       108 
5.2 ‘FAW’ and ERA 1999        112 
5.2.1 Trade Union Recognition through the Schedule A1 Procedure   115 
5.2.2 The Union’s Request, Bargaining Units and the Employer’s Response  117 
5.2.3 Provision for De-Recognition        120 
5.3 The New Legislation in Practice       121 
5.3.1 The Effect of the ‘Small Business Exclusion’     128 
5.4 The ILO and TUC Responses to the Introduction of Schedule A1   131 
5.5  ERA 2004 and Issues of ‘Union Busting’      133 
5.6 Comparing the UK and Australian Systems      136 
Summary          137 
 
 
  
CHAPTER SIX  
THE UK AND AUSTRALIAN MODELS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  140 
 
Introduction          140 
6.1 The Respective Characters of the UK and Australian Recognition Models Today 141 
6.1.1 Continuing Non-Compliance with ILO Conventions     144 
6.1.2 ‘Excluding Small Businesses’       146 
6.1.3 UK ‘Coalition’ and Conservative Governments from 2010    149 
Summary          150 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY          157 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank Ms Kay Wheat (Reader in Law at Nottingham Trent University), Mr 
Graham Ferris (Reader in Law at Nottingham Trent University) and Dr Jeremé Snook 
(formerly Senior Lecturer in Employment Law and Employment Relations at Nottingham 
Trent University and now Senior Lecturer in Law at Sheffield Hallam University) for their 
invaluable patience, stimulating discussion, good humour and advice while supervising my 
work.  I would also like to thank the University’s Library and Support staff for all of their help 
whenever I have called on them for assistance. 
  
TABLE OF CASES 
 
 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
Aslef v United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 184 
 
Associated Newspapers Limited v Wilson [1993] IRLR 336 (CA)* 
 
Associated British Ports v Palmer [1995] IRLR 258 (HL)* 
 
Association of HSD (Hatfield) Employees v Certification Officer [1978] IRLR 261 
 
British Association of Advisers and Lecturers in Physical Education v National Union of 
Teachers [1986] IRLR 497 
 
Blue Circle Staff Association v The Certification Officer [1977] IRLR 20 
 
Burke v Royal Liverpool University Trust Hospital [1997] ICR 730 
 
Frost v Clarke & Smith Manufacturing Co Ltd [1973] IRLR 216 
 
Hornby v Close [1867] 10 Cox CC 393 
 
Osborne v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1910] AC 87 
 
Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 
 
R v Mawbey [1796] 6 TR 619 
 
Robertson v British Gas Corporation [1983] IRLR 302  
 
Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2) [1972] ICR 19 
 
Taff Vale Railway Company v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] UKHL 1 
 
Thomas v NUM (South Wales Area) [1985] IRLR 136 
 
Whent v T Cartledge Ltd [1997] IRLR 153 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
Demir and Baykara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345 
 
Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey [2009] App 68959/01 
 
National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium, Judgment entered 22 October 1975, Series A, 
No 19 [1979-80] 1 EHRR 578. 
 
* ‘Wilson and Palmer’ [2002] IRLR 128 
 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Asahi Diamond Industrial Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals and Engineering 
Union [1995] 59 IR 385 
 
Burwood Cinema Limited v Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees Association 
[1925] 35 CLR 528 
 
JJ Richards Pty Ltd v Transport Workers' Union of Australia [2011] FWAFB 1329 
 
Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association [1908] 6 CLR 309 
 
Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1935] 54 CLR 387 
 
NSW v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52 
 
Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] 195 CLR 
1; (1998) HCA 30 
 
Public Sector, Professional, Scientific Research, Technical, Communications, Aviation and 
Broadcasting Union v Australian broadcasting Commission ('ABC Case') [1994] 36 AILR 
372 
 
Rowe v TWU [1998] 160 ALR 6 
 
Williams v Hursey [1959] 103 CLR 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
Combination Act 1799 
 
Combination Act 1800 
 
Master and Servant Act 1823 
 
Combination of Workmen Act 1824 
 
Combination Laws Repeal Amendment Act 1825 
 
Molestation of Workmen Act 1859 
 
Master and Servant Act 1867 
 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871 
 
Trade Union Act 1871 
 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 
 
Trade Disputes Act 1906 
 
Trade Union Act 1913 
 
Trade Union Act 1964 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 
 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
 
Employment Protection Act 1975 
 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 
 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
 
Employment Act 1980 
 
Employment Act 1982 
 
Trade Union Act 1984 
 
Employment Act 1988 
 
Employment Act 1990 
 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
 
Employment Relations Act 1999 
 
Employment Relations Act 2004 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 11 
 
ILO Convention 87, ‘Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise’ 
 
ILO Convention 98, ‘Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively’ 
 
ILO Convention 135, ‘Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers’ Representatives 
in the Undertaking’ 
 
ILO Convention 151, ‘Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining 
Conditions of Employment in the Public Service’ 
 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN) 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN) 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UN) 
 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) 
 
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 
 
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 
 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
 
Workplace Relations Amendment Act 2005 (Cth) 
 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 
 
Fair Work Act 2009 
 
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the distinct approaches taken by legal jurisdictions in the United 
Kingdom and Australia to the question of how their citizens might exercise freedom of 
association rights in employment, forming representative bodies – principally in the form of 
trade unions – that can muster collective strength and bargain with employers to secure the 
economic and social well-being of their members.  The German-born British scholar Otto 
Kahn-Freund transmitted his observations of employer-employee relations that he made during 
the mid-20th century into a theory that acknowledged an almost complete retreat by the law 
from - and embraced a role for the state as a mere facilitator within – the UK’s industrial 
relations.  His notion of a ‘collective laissez-faire’ kind of approach to the settlement of the 
terms of employment still resonates with labour lawyers and provides a framework within 
which effective analysis of contemporary industrial relations issues can continue to take place.  
Governments both in the UK and Australia have, over recent decades, attempted to exert more 
influence over the manner in which these relationships are conducted through tighter regulation 
of trade union activity and by shifting the emphasis of labour law away from the collective 
kinds of approaches that have traditionally been used to resolve workplace conflict to one that 
has promoted and significantly enhanced the individual’s “personal” employment rights and 
entitlements at work with consequent effects on their respective legal provision for recognition 
of trade unions. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Individual nations’ approaches to the regulation of industrial relations between 
employers and their employees have, inevitably, varied according to the character of their legal 
systems and the political, social and economic influences that have “shaped” their individual 
societies.  Worker organisation for the purpose of bargaining and settling the terms of 
employment with employers is, in states in the ‘modern free world’, governed through the 
exercise of work-related freedom of association rights.  These enable employees to join 
together and form associations, usually (if not necessarily) in the form of ‘trade unions’, that 
can represent their interests and secure improvements to pay and conditions on behalf of their 
members.  The social revolution founded on a clamour for wider societal democracy and 
equality began to take hold during the latter part of the 18th century led directly to the 
entrenchment of a labour movement and then continued and dramatic expansion of trade 
unionism through two more centuries.  National and international law and the regional and 
global treaties and conventions that seek to facilitate trade union activity and recognise 
individual unions as representatives of both collective and individual employee interests 
embody the response of the law to that phenomenon.      
 
This study follows the evolution of UK law beginning with its early opposition to trade 
unionism per say and its consequent imposition of criminal sanctions designed to maintain 
socio-economic stability.  This gave way to increased “toleration” in the form of immunities 
that were developed and bestowed upon trade unions to protect them against the so-called 
‘economic torts’ at the start of the 20th century and the inception of measures designed first to 
curb union power and then more precisely regulate the involvement of unions in bargaining 
processes with employers at its end.  It also contains a significant comparative element with 
the inclusion of a detailed exposition of Australia’s simultaneous establishment and 
development of arrangements that would enshrine trade unions firmly within its federal and 
state industrial relations system. 
 
The work of the renowned academic, Otto Kahn-Freund – and, in particular, his theory 
of a minimal role for the state as a facilitator for parties on either side of the employer-employee 
industrial relations “divide”, represents a recurring and vital “backdrop” within the discussion 
of arrangements that both countries have instituted to acknowledge a role for trade unions as 
representatives of collective worker interest may take place and conclusions regarding the 
effect of international legal instruments, globally accepted labour standards and their “post-
Kahn Freund era” domestic legislation on those “models”. 
 
  
 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN  
KAHN-FREUND’S THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The lawful right of workers to associate, organise and assemble with colleagues to pursue 
common objectives while at work is the product of struggles that have taken place over time 
between competing interests of capital and labour and conflicting political ideologies.1  A 
defining characteristic of UK collective labour law has been its historical commitment to what 
has variously been referred to as voluntarism and/or legal absenteeism.2  These terms refer to 
the character of the system of collective bargaining that has evolved under English law and 
shown itself to be relatively free of regulation.  The traditional view that both the law and legal 
profession preferred that they should “withdraw” from the industrial relations arena was most 
famously articulated by the German scholar Otto Kahn-Freund during his long and 
distinguished academic career in England from the early 1930s.  Prior to Kahn-Freund’s 
publication of his ‘theory of industrial relations’, the (English) common law’s stance had been 
one of “deep-rooted” hostility towards workers’ collective self-organisation.3  This revealed 
itself from the 19th century as the crime (and later tort) of conspiracy, the doctrine of restraint 
of trade (as a ground for the invalidation of contracts) and in the form of the ‘economic torts’ 
(conceived to protect the trade and livelihoods of businesses and individuals against direct or 
                                                          
1 Bob Hepple, ‘Factors Influencing the Making and Transformation of Labour Law in Europe’, in Guy Davidov 
and Brian Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law )Oxford University Press 2011) 40. 
2 Alan Bogg, ‘Representation of Employees in Collective Bargaining within the Firm: Voluntarism in the UK’, 
Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law (July 2006); A Chommeloux, ‘Bevin, the Law 
and Industrial Relations in Britain: The Impact of the Second World War Assessed’, Université François-
Rabelais (Tours) (9 March 2005). 
3 Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris, Labour Law (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 13. 
intentional interference).  Support for these measures persisted into and throughout the modern 
period4 until it became clear that some form of statutory intervention would be required if 
lawful union activity was to take place.5  Chapter One discusses the most significant aspects of 
Kahn-Freund’s philosophy with particular emphasis on his representation of 20th century 
British industrial relations regulation in a conceptual model dubbed ‘collective laissez-faire’6 
and including his classification of most of the UK’s labour law as ‘abstentionist’ in character. 
 
    
1.1 Kahn-Freund’s Theory Explored 
 
Otto Kahn-Freund’s observations on industrial relations issues have impacted 
significantly on the thinking of UK labour lawyers7, trade unionists, employers, judges and 
successive governments of differing persuasions over several decades.8  Born into a middle-
class Jewish family in 1900, he studied law at the University of Frankfurt under the direction 
of Professor Hugo Sinzheimer and readily acknowledged his tutor’s “decisive influence” on 
his own work.9  Sinzheimer demanded that his students looked beyond the mere content of 
legal provisions and encouraged them to also develop an understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between legal theory and the realities of social and economic power, the practical 
operation of the law and the formation of legal policy.  He argued that employment contracts 
served as a “mask” for employer “domination” and employee “subordination” and promoted a 
sense of trade unions and employer associations as “law creators” by virtue of their interaction 
in collective disputes, participation in collective bargaining and as concluders of agreements 
                                                          
4 ibid 6. 
5 ibid 7. 
6 Alan Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Hart Publishing 2009) 3.  
7 Anne Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 3. 
8 Ruth Dukes, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone?’ (2009) 72(2) 
MLR 220. 
9 Roy Lewis, ‘Kahn-Freund and Labour Law: an Outline Critique’ (1979) 8 (1) ILJ 202, 204. 
(though he conceded that there would inevitably always be the need for some state 
involvement, whether as a facilitator or the ultimate enforcer of rules).  Kahn-Freund completed 
a PhD study of the normative effect of collective agreements between employers and 
employees at Frankfurt before securing an appointment as a judge in the Berlin labour court 
from 1928.  His old tutor’s ideas continued to endure both in his judicial decisions while there 
and throughout his subsequent academic career.10 
 
Kahn-Freund published two keynote pamphlets while working as a judge.  These were 
‘The Social Ideal of the Reich Labour Court’ in 1931 and ‘The Changing Function of Labour 
Law’ a year later.  Both set bare Kahn-Freund’s unease with the “interference of an over-
zealous State” in matters that he believed ought to remain the autonomous concerns of 
employer and worker representatives.11  The publications were considered to be highly 
provocative by the Nazis (the first pamphlet identified an encroachment into ‘the Court’ of the 
kind of fascist values already embodied in Italian labour legislation while the second analysed 
the shift of Weimar labour law away from the promotion of “collectivism” and a legitimate 
role for trade unions in collective industrial conflict to suppression of workers’ concerns 
through the weakening of unions and reinforcement of State mechanisms, all as a precursor to 
accelerated development of Nazi labour policy).12  Kahn-Freund was dismissed by the Nazis 
in 1933.  He fled to the UK, pursued a career in academia and became, according to Roy Lewis, 
“the doyen of British labour law”.13 
 
            
1.1.1 ‘Legal Abstentionsim’ and ‘Collective Laissez-Faire’ 
                                                          
10 ibid. 
11 Dukes (n8) 224. 
12 Lewis (n9) 205. 
13 ibid 202. 
 Kahn-Freund’s concerns regarding the role of the state and his fervent desire that there 
should be autonomous regulation of industrial relations by the collective parties would remain 
recurring themes in his work in the UK.  He completed an LLM in 1935 at the London School 
of Economics (LSE), qualified as a barrister at Middle Temple and was then appointed as a 
lecturer at the LSE in 1936.  He became Professor there in 1951 and finally left in 1964 to take 
up the position of Chair of Comparative Law at Oxford.  His early studies of English labour 
law saw him apply his knowledge of German collectivist principles to UK industrial relations 
and legislation.  He continued to emphasise the concept of the individual contract of 
employment as a ‘mask’ for worker subordination and studied the effects of the conflict that 
he believed arose between conservative judges and more enlightened legislatures, while his 
experiences in the Weimar Republic continued to influence his examination of collective 
agreements.14  His long-held conviction that trade unions should be able to operate 
“autonomously” appeared to sit well with what he saw at that time as an English preference for 
(relatively) small government and adherence to pluralism.15  His first article on the UK’s 
collective labour law was published in 1943 and considered the effects of wartime legislation 
on “the legal status” of collective agreements.16  Pursuing Sinzheimer’s thinking, he 
distinguished between the ‘contractual’ and ‘normative’ functions (concerned with standards) 
of collective agreements and determined that any such accords concluded in the UK were 
contractual in the legal sense.  The trade unions and employers (and their associations) that 
were party to them were accordingly bound to abide by the terms contained within them17, 
while the use of statutory means to enforce collective agreements could be justified if this 
bolstered autonomous collective bargaining.  He maintained his opposition, however, to the 
                                                          
14 Dukes (n8) 230. 
15 ibid 223. 
16 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Collective Agreements Under War Legislation’ (1943) 6(3) MLR 112. 
17 Dukes (n8) 231. 
introduction of compulsory arbitration to settle disputes on the basis that it could only threaten 
bargaining processes.18  This early “unfolding” of his theory coincided with the development 
by a United Nations agency, the International Labour Organisation, of its Conventions 87 
(‘Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise’) and 98 (‘Right to Organise 
and Bargain Collectively’), both of which will be considered in more depth in Chapter Two of 
this thesis.  These all combined to inform and promote the development of collective labour 
law during the immediate post-Second World War period.   
 
Kahn-Freund began to adjust aspects of his work in line with his changing perceptions 
of UK industrial relations during the early 1950s, concluding that it was no longer possible 
simply to apply German law principles to English conditions.19  He continued to draw heavily 
on his personal experience of living and working in the Weimar Republic, but he no longer 
looked upon collective agreements as legally binding contracts and instead focused on the 
extent to which industrial relations were exercised “beyond the reaches of the law”.20  His 
declaration, in 1954, that “there is, perhaps, no major country in the world in which the law has 
played a less significant role in the shaping of these (collective industrial) relations than in 
Great Britain and in which day-to-day the law and the legal profession have less to do with 
labour relations”21 was the first recognisable expression of the philosophical ‘model’ that 
evolved and became ‘collective laissez-faire’.  He believed that it was both a term that 
conveyed the real sense of “the retreat of the law from industrial relations and of industrial 
relations from the law” and that it represented an “ideal” that the legal system should strive to 
maintain.22  Fully explained, he judged that it encapsulated the “particularly British approach” 
                                                          
18 ibid 232. 
19 ibid 223. 
20 ibid 232. 
21 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’, in Allan Flanders and Hugh Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain (Oxford 1954) 42. 
22 Otto Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings (Stevens 1978) 9. 
to industrial relations regulation and reflected successive UK governments’ enthusiasm for the 
promotion of collective bargaining as a means of setting terms and conditions of employment 
and resolving industrial disputes.23  Collective agreements now merely bestowed ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’ on those who were parties to them.  Enforcement of agreements was a social rather 
than a legal responsibility24, but their normative elements could be made legally binding 
through a process of voluntary incorporation into individual employment contracts.25  The UK 
regime therefore differed from that in the Weimar Republic, where collective agreements were 
legally enforceable as a matter of routine.   
 
Kahn-Freund’s consideration of the issues surrounding legal abstentionism (or 
voluntarism) was heavily influenced by his view of “pluralist society”, which he believed 
consisted of a number of conflicting sectional groups including “the autonomous collective 
forces of capital and labour.”26  He argued that the “imbalance of power” between individual 
employees and employers was of such magnitude that it rendered any idea of workers’ freedom 
of contract completely illusory.27  Collective bargaining could, however, be used across whole 
industries and within workplaces to mitigate the inequality that was inherent in individual 
employment relationships and help maintain industrial conflict within tolerable bounds.  
Workers could counter the negative effects of their “submissive” relationship with employers 
if they banded together to form trade unions to increase their bargaining power with the state’s 
role confined to one of acting as “the custodian of the national interest.”  This meant ensuring 
that only those levels of co-ordination that were deemed strictly necessary for the effective 
maintenance of collective relations should be established and that any legislation that was 
                                                          
23 Dukes (n8) 232. 
24 Kahn-Freund (n21), 57-58. 
25 ibid 58-61. 
26 Lewis (n9) 209. 
27 Paul Davies, Mark Freedland and Otto Kahn-Freund, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (3rd edn, Stevens 
1983) 8. 
introduced was (at least theoretically) “even-handed” in character.  There had also to be some 
means of instilling “greater equilibrium” in the employment relationship as a pre-condition for 
meaningful collective bargaining.  Kahn-Freund believed that to sustain and endorse 
autonomous collective powers and endow them with freedom of action was merely to observe 
some of the essential requirements of a democratic society.  Industrial action was bound to 
break out from time to time, but a more stringent system of regulation would simply encourage 
more “unofficial” kinds of skirmishes.  Statutory intervention, such as the introduction of the 
immunities for trade unions created in TDA 1906, could be justified where it helped to establish 
greater equilibrium between employers and employees.28 
 
Kahn-Freund emphasised that the other fundamental requirement of abstentionist policy 
was that there should be minimal state intervention in “individual” employment relations, that 
regulation should instead be undertaken by the autonomous collective concerns and that any 
laws that were introduced in respect of collective labour relations should remain pointedly 
“non-interventionist” in character.  Parliament should, therefore, avoid regulating in respect of 
trade union recognition or unions’ organisational rights, the non-contractual status of collective 
agreements and the wholly consensual (and non-compulsory) incorporation of terms agreed by 
the collective parties into individual contracts of employment.29  The state also sought to 
encourage the resolution of disputes through a system of conciliation and arbitration ahead of 
recourse to direct legal sanction.30  Kahn-Freund’s preference for collective bargaining was 
based on three assertions.  First, he argued that legal intervention was unnecessary because 
collective bargaining had shown itself to be an effective means of protecting workers’ interests.  
Second, he claimed that rights that had been secured by workers through collective bargaining 
                                                          
28 Lewis (n9) 209. 
29 ibid 208. 
30 ibid 209. 
remained somehow more robust and had acquired a legitimacy that could not be secured 
through any kind of constitutional or legislative guarantee.  Third, he argued that the collective 
laissez-faire model afforded employers and unions flexibility to take charge of their own affairs 
and respond to changing circumstances to a greater extent than would be the case if they were 
subject to more stringent legislative “constraints”.31  The state’s role was to remain in the 
background, from where it could promote the creation of unions and establish machinery 
deemed necessary to facilitate collective bargaining.32  In other words, it could be suggested 
that the model “allowed space” for the creation (and validation) of trade union organisation 
that itself facilitated freedom of association in employment.  Recognition at the legal level was 
not the basis of freedom of association.  Instead, the law permitted and supported a freedom of 
association and trade union organisation that led to de facto recognition of trade unions by 
employers.  A vibrant, “organic” trade union movement neither sought legal legitimisation nor 
any kind of formal recognition.  Autonomy was maintained and sufficient freedom of collective 
action provided in order that processes could be established through which effective collective 
bargaining could be progressed.  
 
            
1.1.2 Kahn-Freund’s Subsequent Embrace of ‘Interventionism’  
 
Kahn-Freund sat as a member of the Donovan Commission from 1965 to 1968.  One of 
his Commission associates, Professor Hugh Clegg, suggested that Kahn-Freund’s perception 
of the actuality of UK industrial relations was no longer what it had been during the period 
when he conceived his notion of collective laissez-faire.  He was said to have concluded that 
trade union national leaderships and employers’ associations at the “industry level” did not 
                                                          
31 Davies (n7). 
32 Lewis (n9). 
exert influence over the settlement of terms and conditions to the extent that he had thought 
previously and that they were in fact almost mere observers of wider and more erratic forms of 
workplace level bargaining and industrial action that had taken hold.33  Kahn-Freund revealed 
his growing enthusiasm for legal intervention in his 1968 submission to Donovan, ‘Note on the 
Legal Enforceability of Collective Agreements’, which argued that the Minister of Labour 
should play an active role in the reference of contentious matters to compulsory arbitration and 
the legal enforcement of compliance with arbitration orders.   
 
In his 1970 article, ‘Trade Unions, the Law and Society’34, Kahn-Freund suggested that 
the time had come  to remove the “dead hand” of historical trade union opposition to legal 
involvement in their internal affairs, although he cautioned that unions’ distrust of the court 
system should be acknowledged within that process35 and argued for the introduction of a legal 
remedy to address controls that he believed, while not widespread, were being unacceptably 
imposed by some unions to restrict access to certain sections of the labour market.36  In 1972, 
he made clear his disapproval of the picketing practices employed during the miners’ strike 
earlier on during that year.37  Each of his submissions reflected a far more accommodating 
stance towards direct legal intervention in industrial relations than had been implied in his 
earlier exposition of collective laissez-faire and he was now prepared to express a view that the 
principal purpose of labour law was “to regulate, to support and to restrain the power of 
management and the power of organised labour”.  The welfare state had a role as the provider 
of institutions and processes that could help to maintain a “fair” balance between employers 
and workers with a focus on subordinated workers within the employment relationship rather 
                                                          
33 Dukes (n8) 239. 
34 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Trade Unions, the Law and Society’ (1970) 33(3) MLR 241. 
35 ibid 241. 
36 ibid 243. 
37 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘The Industrial Relations Act 1971 - Some retrospective reflections’ (1974) 3 ILJ 186. 
than any wider analysis of the labour market as a whole.38 
 
In his final (1979) book39, Kahn-Freund acknowledged the upheaval in industrial 
relations during the 1970s including the general upsurge in turmoil and the effects towards the 
end of the decade of the expansion of the service and white-collar sectors.40  He felt that the 
effects were visible in legislation as well as in collective bargaining and disputes and that one 
of the principal consequences had been the supplementation of voluntary recognition with 
statutory recognition.  He justified this on the basis that it helped to sustain collective 
bargaining in the face of employer hostility to union activity41 and because the constitution of 
the working population had prompted a “much enlarged sphere of legislation applicable to the 
individual relations between employer and employee.”42  He had become much more troubled 
by the “social effects” of industrial action and what he saw as the consumer (rather than the 
employer) having become the object of such skirmishes.  He believed that hardship had been 
visited on people who could not possibly seek to influence the outcome of particular disputes 
and that “victimisation” of the working class proportion of the consumer population was now 
commonplace.43  He rejected the proposition that there should be any curbs on the right to strike 
and instead argued for reform of collective bargaining processes that might help avoid 
industrial action and understanding within union circles that workers were “consumers” as well 
as “producers” (of goods and services).44  
 
            
Summary 
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 An obvious criticism that can be made of Kahn-Freund’s work is that it does not appear 
in the form of one explicit or comprehensive “essay”, leaving students to assemble his theory 
largely by themselves from the various texts that he published over several decades from his 
arrival in the UK in 1933 through to the post-Donovan and ‘Social Contract’ era of the 1970s.  
Kahn-Freund’s supporters would presumably counter such claims by pointing out that his 
theory was quite necessarily developed over several decades, featuring all manner of disparate 
episodes in British social history and including the most significant global armed conflict that 
humans have ever experienced? 
 
Ruth Dukes articulates many of more substantive concerns that have been levelled at 
Khan-Freund’s work.  She refers to the Hugh Clegg’s inference45 that Kahn-Freund’s early 
assessment of UK industrial relations was unduly “rosy” and that it perhaps reflected an overly-
simplistic comparison between an over-bearing exercise of state power in Germany by 1933 
and English institutions that encouraged discussion and participation, including by workers and 
their unions.46  Kahn-Freund did, of course, later concede that it was not possible simply to 
“replicate” every aspect of his Weimar experience in the UK.  Dukes also cites criticisms by 
Roy Lewis and Keith Ewing that the conception of ‘collective laissez-faire’, complete with its 
assertions that successive governments preference for collective bargaining as a method of job 
regulation had left employers and trade unions “free” to agree the ‘rules’ that governed working 
lives and production47 and that legislative intervention in workplaces had been accorded “a 
necessary but (only) secondary role”48, did not in any way portray the historical evolution of 
British labour law, not least because it ignored workers’ and trade unions’ struggles for 
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Parliamentary recognition of their legal rights and downplayed the state’s part in the 
establishment of effective collective bargaining “infrastructure”.49  A particular accusation 
levelled at Kahn-Freund has been that he failed to define a convincing role for the state in 
industrial relations (as Sinzheimer had when he described its function as “the guardian of the 
public interest”).50  Dukes believes that Kahn-Freund’s pre-occupation that employers and 
trade unions possessed an ability to “self-regulate” their relations without state involvement 
was naïve in that it implied that neither would choose to make “unreasonable” demands of the 
other and that both sides could be relied on to bargain with the public’s interest in mind as well 
as their own concerns.  She acknowledges that Kahn-Freund eventually recognised this 
shortcoming in his theory but suggests that he remained reluctant to properly endow the state 
with appropriate levels of responsibility within the system of management for industrial 
relations.  She concludes that he remained content to view the ‘public interest’ in terms of the 
consumer’s expectation that production and industrial harmony should be maintained and 
disputes his inference that the employers should be identified as the guarantor of that interest.51   
 
Kahn-Freund’s name would latterly become more synonymous with findings contained 
in the 1968 Donovan Report.  It should be noted though that while he had by then become 
convinced that “classical” collective laissez-faire had been overtaken by changing 
circumstances, he maintained his opposition to what he believed were the impractical, counter-
productive and anti-trade union provisions contained in IRA 1971.  His final book, Labour 
Relations: Heritage and Adjustment, was his attempt to respond to changing socio-economic 
conditions and ensure that his work remained relevant following the expansion of collective 
bargaining in the white collar and service sectors and the increase in trade unions’ political 
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power under successive governments.  Dukes concedes that in circumstances where “the 
regulation of employment relations has less and less in common with the forms of regulation 
described by Kahn-Freund”, the collective laissez-faire “doctrine” continues to resonate with 
labour lawyers and remains their “most obvious starting point for discussion of employment 
law and employment relations.”52  The intention in this study, is to use Kahn-Freund’s 
industrial relations theory as a “frame” within which the evolution and characteristics of the 
UK and Australian models of union recognition may be appraised and the extent to which they 
comply with the various treaties and conventions that have been accepted by democratic states 
internationally as having established ‘norms’ and standards that their societies should observe.  
The purpose of Chapter Two will be to explore the most significant of those measures in detail.  
The remainder of the study will consider how the UK and Australian authorities’ early reliance 
on criminal and civil sanctions to curb individuals’ participation in trade unions gave way to 
distinct models of recognition that were designed to regulate and control rather than prohibit 
union activity (whether in the form of Kahn-Freund’s notion of a ‘collective laissez-faire’ 
regime or the state’s creation of a ‘Social Contract’ that allowed large unions to wield 
substantial power in the UK for a period during the 1970s or Australia’s “incorporation” of the 
trade union function into its arbitration- and conciliation-based industrial relations system) and 
assess their respective legislatures recent attempts to more closely “prescribe” how trade 
unionists may exercise their rights. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LEGAL UNDERPINNING OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN  
THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Two identifies the principal European and global legal “instruments” that 
purport to guarantee employees the human right to freedom of association.  It examines the 
extent to which “the law” has acknowledged collective labour force interests resulting in the 
formation of professional associations or trade unions by workers seeking to defend their 
economic and social interests, identifies some of the essential characteristics of trade unions 
and endeavours to assess the continuing impact of legal intervention on workplace bargaining 
and trade union activity. 
 
The fact that human rights generally in the United Kingdom and Europe tend most 
commonly to be discussed in the context of the protection afforded to them by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) should not detract from the significant other legal 
mechanisms that exist and purport to protect freedom of association and assembly in the 
context of workers’ right to organise throughout the wider global community.  Principal among 
these are the collection of documents (a resolution and two treaties) that have been adopted by 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and have, together, become known informally as 
the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’.  The provisions that they contain form the basis of 
international, regional and national labour law rights, all of which continue to be observed by 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the UN agency whose international standards 
uphold the rights of workers and employers to form organisations and then bargain collectively. 
       
2.1 Components of Freedom of Assembly and Association 
 
 The right to freedom of association has particular resonance in the context of labour law 
because of the opportunity that it affords workers to form trade unions as vehicles through 
which they may secure their economic and social status.  Asmita Naik has identified particular 
‘Rights at Stake’ that she believes remain central to freedom of assembly and association and 
enjoy protection in international and regional human rights treaties and conventions.53  The 
first right is the right to peaceful assembly, which should only be denied in situations of national 
security or public safety (the right to violent assembly is not upheld while international 
standards also place limits on the force that authorities may use to control peaceful and non-
peaceful assemblies).  The second right is that of association, which covers the right of 
individuals to freely associate with others and establish associations (it is suggested that some 
countries have attempted to outlaw particular groups or activities on political grounds or 
impose bureaucratic measures designed to obstruct citizens’ free exercise of the right).  The 
third right is to join or not join an association, including consideration of any reprisals that may 
be visited on individuals who join (proscribed) organisations and coercion of citizens to join 
state-approved groups.   
 
The fourth of “Naik’s rights” is the right to belong to trade unions.  It splits into further 
“sub-rights”, whose cumulative effect is to render the individual’s union membership effective.  
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The first sub-right enables individuals to form and join unions in order that they can secure 
their economic and social interests and has met with resistance from some states (who have 
sought to impose restrictions on union activity both through national legislation that purports 
to exclude certain categories of workers and the international law exception that permits them 
to bar members of the police and armed forces from membership).  The second sub-right 
enables trade unionists to form national and international confederations and this has also been 
resisted by some states.  A third sub-right specifies that individuals should have the right not 
to be penalised for belonging to a union and that membership should not be used to deny 
employment to new applicants or to discipline, disadvantage or dismiss existing employees.  
The fourth sub-right, the right to strike, is not an absolute right and is invariably “fettered” by 
other societal interests including in occupations where employees provide essential public 
services.54  A final (fifth) sub-right permits organisations to elect representatives and establish 
their own rules and constitutions, ostensibly free of “unreasonable interference in their 
governance” by state authorities (the interpretation of which may prove highly controversial).55   
 
The fifth “substantive right” specifies that restrictions should not be placed on any of the 
above unless save for on grounds of national security or public safety.  Naik suggests that the 
narrow interpretation favoured so far by institutions such as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), will  prove most effective in ensuring that freedom of association rights in 
employment may be denied only in exceptional circumstances.  The views of libertarians and 
others who remain trenchantly opposed to any suggestion that collective rights should take 
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precedence over those of individuals will, of course, continue to appear irreconcilable with any 
legal framework that purports to support trade union rights. 
 
 
2.1.1 The Significance of Freedom of Association in the Context of Employment 
 
Rights to freedom of association in employment provide a means through which workers 
may form representative trade unions that they can then use to challenge the inherent 
“imbalance” in the relationship between employers and individual employees.  The Director-
General of the International Labour Office has reported that the freedoms to associate and 
bargain collectively are fundamental rights that represent the most obvious means through 
which employers and employees may settle terms and conditions of employment.56  Workers 
who are able to exercise bargaining rights can enhance their personal economic and social well-
being and may discover that they can exert greater influence over government policies.  Thus, 
legal recognition of these rights can impact on the governance of the labour market and yield 
solutions to the sources of conflict that can exist in employer-employee relations.  UK 
Conservative ministers acknowledged the need to protect employees’ freedom of association 
(and their right to strike)57 in their 1981 Parliamentary Green Paper, ‘Trade Union 
Immunities’58, which stated that: 
“The freedom of employees to combine and withdraw their labour is their fundamental 
safeguard against the inherent imbalance of power between the employer and the individual 
employee.  This freedom has to be accepted as a hallmark of a free society”. 
 
It follows that for such freedom of association to prove meaningful, then a process of collective 
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bargaining between employees and their employer must be established.  Independent trade 
unions, with their infrastructure and ability to organise, can act with more potency than less 
powerful staff associations in workplaces where they enjoy recognition. 
 
    
2.2 European Freedom of Assembly and Association Rights 
 
The pre-eminent body responsible for post-Second World War protection of European 
rights to freedom of assembly and association has been the Council of Europe (CoE).  The 
CoE, unlike the European Union (EU), is not a “binding law maker”.  It instead promotes 
collaboration between member states in respect of human rights, the development of 
democratic principles and “cultural co-operation”, principally through the ECHR.  
Responsibility for ensuring that Member States comply with its provisions rests with the 
ECtHR. 
 
 
2.2.1 Article 11 of the ECHR 
 
The ECHR’s Article 11 guarantees rights to freedom of assembly and association.  It 
states that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of 
the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. 
 
Citizens can choose whether to form and join associations such as political parties and 
trade unions, but the entitlement is not without restrictions.  Mass protest, demonstration and 
industrial action are all common manifestations of the exercise of the right.  Article 11(1) 
confers a positive obligation on member states to legislate to protect both public and private 
sector workers’ union rights59, but omits to specify details of the nature of the treatment that 
trade unions or their members can expect to enjoy.60  Union members have a right that the 
union is heard61, which includes the provision of facilities by the employer to the union to allow 
it to make representations.62  The ECtHR’ has adopted a “cautious approach” when determining 
which union rights should be recognised and protected under national law63, “stranding” Article 
11 some way short of the ILO’s aspirations.  It (the ECtHR) was not for a long time prepared 
to hold that a union has the right to be consulted or recognised for the purpose of collective 
bargaining of pay and conditions.64  This permitted employers to decide whether to enter into 
such bargaining with a trade union or negotiate directly with individual employees, suggesting 
that workers could be denied the opportunity to exercise trade union rights and that the 
protection purported under Article 11 could be rendered “illusory”.65  The right in Article 11 
not to have to join a trade union is also assured with a positive obligation placed on member 
states to ensure enforcement.  Meanwhile, in Aslef v United Kingdom66, the ECtHR ruled that 
the Article 11 provisions did not extend so far as to specify that anyone should be able to join 
a union irrespective of its rules, so accepting that unions had the right of stewardship in their 
own affairs and running contrary to the effect of much UK legislation from 1980.  
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2.2.2 The Ruling in Demir and Baykara v Turkey 
 
In Demir and Baykara v Turkey67, the ECtHR reversed its earlier jurisprudence to hold 
that the exercise of the right under Article 11 to form and join trade unions included the right 
to collective bargaining.  The case involved the Tum Bel Sen trade union, which represented 
civil servants in Turkey.  Turkish trade union law however, did not permit civil service trade 
unionism at the time when the union was formed.  Demir (a member) and Baykara (the union 
president) represented the union and its members and claimed that the right to bargain 
collectively was an intrinsic component of Article 11.  The Court held that the declaration 
contained in Article 11(1) and the restrictions set out in Article 11(2) should be “strictly 
construed”.  The right to organise remained sacrosanct, while the ability to bargain collectively 
with the employer had become enshrined as one of the essential elements of the right to form 
and join trade unions under Article 11.  Member states had to demonstrate that any proposed 
restrictions were legitimate and civil servants could not be deemed to be included as part of 
“the administration of the State”.68 
 
The ECtHR expanded on its ruling in Demir in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey69, which 
was a case concerned with prohibition by the state of public sector union-sponsored industrial 
action.  Members of the Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen trade union who had ignored the prohibition were 
disciplined by their employer, prompting the union to argue before the ECtHR that the ban on 
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strikes interfered with their right to form and join trade unions under Article 11.  The Court 
acknowledged that the right to strike was not absolute and could be subject to certain conditions 
and restrictions, but held that a ban that applied to all public servants represented a restriction 
that was too wide and that the state’s disciplinary action was “capable of discouraging trade 
union members and others from exercising their legitimate right to take part in such one-day 
strikes or other actions aimed at defending their members’ interests” to the point where it did 
not amount to a justifiable restriction on Article 11 rights. 
   
Keith Ewing and John Hendy argue that the decision in Demir and Baykara saw “social 
and economic rights… fused permanently with civil and political rights, in a process that is 
potentially nothing less than a socialisation of civil and political rights.”70  They conclude that 
“it is a decision in which human rights have established their superiority over economic 
irrationalism and ‘competitiveness’ in the battle for the soul of labour law and in which public 
law has triumphed over private law and public lawyers over private lawyers.”71  Charles 
Barrow observes that the ECtHR’s consideration of the scope of Article 11 and interpretation 
of the Turkish authorities’ restrictions (through reference to international instruments and 
common practice across the entire membership of CoE) proved decisive in terms of the final 
ruling, but he also emphasises the importance of the judges’ insistence that international law 
permitted them to consider instruments that had not necessarily been ratified by the respondent 
state72 and argues that the effect of the decision in Demir is to establish the case as one of a 
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number that have, together, extended the scope of Article 11.  The ECtHR’s cautious approach 
in some earlier cases became superseded by its declaration in Demir that the right to participate 
in collective bargaining should be treated as an essential element of the Article 11 right.73  
Separately, it remains open to the ECtHR to choose whether it may embark upon a further, 
more in-depth consideration of UK trade union laws generally at some point in the future.74  
 
 
2.2.3 The EU ‘Social Charter’ (or Social Chapter) 
 
The EU’s Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (or ’Social 
Charter’) was adopted in December 1989 by all member states with the exception of the UK.  
It sets out the rights of employers and workers to form associations and conclude collective 
agreements and upholds the right to strike subject to certain obligations that may be imposed 
under national regulations.  It established the fundamental principles on which the European 
labour law model is based and includes specific provisions in respect of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining as well as information, consultation and participation of workers. 
   
The UK remained exempt from EU legislation covering Social Charter issues and vetoed 
its inclusion in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as its “Social Chapter”.  A compromise was reached 
with the addition to the Treaty instead of a ‘Social Policy Protocol’ that included an ‘opt-out’ 
for the UK and so resulted in the creation of a ‘twin-track’ EU social policy.  All twelve 
member states agreed that the eleven “signatories” would be able to implement employment 
and industrial relations policies compatible with the new procedure laid down in the Agreement 
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on Social Policy annexed to the Protocol.  A newly-elected Labour government in the UK 
terminated the ‘opt-out’ in 1997 ahead of the Treaty of Amsterdam’s deletion in June of that 
year of the Social Policy Protocol and the incorporation of the Agreement on Social Policy 
(with minor amendments) into a revised ‘Social Chapter’ of the EC Treaty.75  
 
 
2.3 The United Nations, Rights and the Promotion of Global Labour Standards 
 
The UN arguably continues to be the pre-eminent global promoter of labour human 
rights, both through the collection of instruments that form the ‘International Bill of Human 
Rights’ and the work of the ILO.  Members of the UN General Assembly have historically 
agreed and directed broad principles and policies to be observed by Member States  in the form 
of declarations and treaties, while authority to draw up and oversee the implementation of 
international labour standards has been delegated to the ILO. 
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2.3.1 The UN General Assembly’s ‘International Bill of Human Rights’ 
 
The UN Charter, agreed following the meeting of delegates of Allied nations at the San 
Francisco Conference from April to June 194576, set out the UN’s purpose and detailed its 
various organs and institutions and their powers, published criteria to be satisfied by members, 
clarified the means through which the organisation’s objectives should be assimilated with 
existing international law mechanisms and explained how the powers of the UN’s various 
bodies would be enforced.  The UN General Assembly undertook to become the lead protector 
of human rights globally and its members resolved it should publish a declaration setting out 
broad human rights principles alongside a convention (treaty) containing tangible, binding 
commitments.  The former document became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and was adopted on 10 December 1948.  The Declaration provided the foundation for 
two separately binding covenants, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)77 to 
reflect differences between General Assembly members regarding the relative significance of 
“negative” civil and political rights and their “positive” economic, social and cultural 
counterparts.78  Together, the three documents form what is sometimes referred to as the 
‘International Bill of Human Rights’.79 
 
The UDHR is, as a resolution of the UN General Assembly, not formally legally binding.  
Its principles have, however, subsequently been incorporated into UN treaties and enshrined in 
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numerous international laws.  The UDHR’s Article 20 states simply that everyone has the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and that nobody can be compelled to belong 
to an association.  Article 23 purports to guarantee decent working conditions and employment 
rights80 and includes specific provision that everyone has the right to form and join trade unions 
in order to protect his or her interests.81 
 
The ICESCR was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1966 to give practical 
effect to the principles set out in the UDHR.  In force since January 1976, it purports to 
safeguard economic, social and cultural rights in the 160 states that are parties to it.82 83  Several 
of its articles guarantee labour rights, including Article 6 (the right to “freely chosen or 
accepted” work), Article 7 (the right to enjoy just and safe working conditions), Article 9 
(concerned with social security and social insurance, including provision for unemployment 
benefits and workers’ compensation rights), Article 10 (which sets out various “family rights”, 
including the entitlement to paid maternity leave84 and measures to prevent exploitation of 
children and young people) and Article 12 (which commits parties to measures to improve 
industrial hygiene85 and combat occupational diseases86).  Provision for freedom of association 
is contained in Article 8, which recognises the right of workers to form and join trade unions87 
and includes protection of the right to strike.88  However, restrictions on these rights can be 
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imposed on members of the armed forces, police and government administrators.89  Article 8 
also enables unions to establish national and international federations90 and function free of 
interference.91  Some parties have chosen to derogate from Article 8’s provisions, including 
China (which chooses to interpret it in a manner consistent with provisions contained within 
its own constitution) and Japan (which has chosen to extend the restriction of union rights that 
it applies to members of its police to include fire service personnel).   
   
The ICCPR, adopted in December 1966 and in force from March 1976, addresses a much 
narrower array of labour rights than the ICESER.  Its Article 8 absolutely prohibits slavery92 
and servitude.93  Forced labour is also outlawed, save for the imposition of ‘hard labour’ as part 
of a criminal sentence, military conscription (as well as other forms of national service required 
of conscientious objectors), compulsory service deemed to be necessary in circumstances of 
“emergency or calamity threatening life or the well-being of the community” and “any work 
or service that forms part of normal civic obligations”.94  Articles 21 and 22 are of more directly 
relevance to trade unionism.  The right to peaceful assembly is recognised in Article 21 while 
Article 22 guarantees freedom of association, including the right to form and join trade 
unions.95  The rights set out in both articles are not subject to any restrictions other than those 
that are prescribed by law and necessary to safeguard national security or public safety or public 
order or protect public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.96  Article 22 also 
acknowledges that it shall not itself prevent any application of lawful restrictions either on 
armed forces or police personnel in respect of any exercise of the right97 and reminds those 
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members of the UN who are also members of the ILO that they should not legislate to any 
extent that the guarantees contained within the ILO’s 1948 Convention No 87 (concerned with 
‘Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise’) become compromised.98  
This appears consistent with the Asmita Naik’s demand (in ‘Rights at Stake’) that rights should 
not be derogated without compelling evidence? 
 
 
2.3.2 The ILO’s Promotion of ‘Labour Standards’ 
 
 
The ILO, established in 1919 by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and a specialised 
agency of the UN since 1946, undertakes its work through three main bodies, the International 
Labour Conference (ILC), the Governing Body and the Office (its secretariat), which consist 
of governments’, employers’ and workers’ representatives.  Its principal objectives are the 
promotion and realisation of employment rights, to improve employment opportunities for all, 
the enhancement of social protections and the strengthening of dialogue between the different 
partners in employment matters.99   
 
The ILC meets annually and brings together government, employer and worker delegates 
from each member state to discuss policy and devise programmes as well as establish 
conventions and produce recommendations (regional meetings of member states are also held 
at periodic intervals to explore matters of particular concern in the geographical areas 
concerned) and it is these conventions and recommendations that combine to form what has 
become known as the ‘International Labour Code’.  Once a convention has been adopted by 
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the ILC, individual governments may ratify it and proceed to give incorporate it in their national 
law.  The convention will evolve into an international law treaty if the requisite number of 
ratifications is reached, although it should be stressed that any ILO convention that has been 
adopted by the ILC becomes “enshrined” as an international labour standard irrespective of the 
number of ratifications. The ILO’s emphasis on ‘tripartism’ ensures that workers, employers 
and governments enjoy equal voting rights.  This, potentially, gives rise to an increase in 
dialogue between the parties and an expectation that a degree of consensus will prevail both in 
the organisation’s ‘internal’ proceedings and in the practical implementation of domestic 
measures by member states.100  The ILO also provides technical help on a range of employment 
law-related topics including industrial relations, working conditions and occupational health 
and safety and assists in the development of independent employers' and workers' organisations 
through provision of advisory services and training. 
 
 
2.3.3 ILO Provision for Freedom of Association and Trade Union Organisation 
 
 
The ILO’s Governing Body has identified eight conventions that it considers 
fundamental to workers’ rights, irrespective of the extent of individual Member States’ 
development and two of these relate specifically to freedom of association.  The first, 
Convention 87, was adopted in 1948 and is concerned with ‘Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise’, while the second, Convention 98, was adopted in 1949 
and involves the ‘Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively’.101   
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 Convention 87 provides for the right of workers and employers both to form and join 
organisations102 and to devise their own administration and activities (including the 
establishment of constitutions and election of representatives) free of state interference.103  
Once it exists, an organisation (defined in the Convention as “any organisation of workers or 
of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers”104) also 
has the right to federate with others both nationally and internationally.105  Responsibility for 
the determination of any such arrangements in respect of members of the police and armed 
forces, however, remains the responsibility of national lawmakers.106  Workers and employers 
and their organisations are obliged to observe their national law during the exercise of their 
rights, so long as that law does not impair any of the Convention’s guarantees.107  Dunning 
emphasises that Convention 87 offers no guarantees either that workers will be able to form 
effective trade unions or that they will be able to advance their interests.108  Its purpose is to 
promote continuing acceptance that workers should have rights that enable them to participate 
in union activity and that all ILO member states should adopt laws or regulations to protect 
those rights.109  Novitz argues that Convention 87 represented, in its inception, a not altogether 
successful attempt to reconcile opposing factions who attended meetings of the ILC in 1947 
and 1948.  She stresses that the trade union rights that it sought to guarantee fell short of those 
already enshrined in the national law of many countries and that there was, for example, no 
explicit reference either to collective bargaining or the right to strike.  Despite these 
reservations, she indicates that Convention 87 deserves recognition as the first ILO convention 
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to set out the organisation’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of association in detail.110 
 
Anti-union discrimination continued to exist despite the introduction of Convention 87 
and the ILO decided to address the problem with the adoption of a further convention, 
Convention 98.111  It guarantees that workers shall not be denied employment on the ground 
that they are members of a trade union and it also forbids the dismissal of those who are already 
employed either for membership or for participation in union activity.112  The autonomous 
nature of workers’ and employers’ organisations is also afforded some protection with a 
particular emphasis that trade unions should remain fully independent of employers.113  
Member states are also required to establish national machinery that fully takes account of the 
right to organise114 and promotes voluntary collective bargaining.115  Two further Conventions 
“supplement” the provisions contained in Conventions 87 and 98.  Convention 135 was 
adopted in 1978 and is titled, ‘Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers’ 
Representatives in the Undertaking’.  It seeks to strengthen protection of workers’ 
representatives against imposition of penalties for discharge of their trade union obligations.  
Convention 151 dates from 1987 and is concerned with ‘Protection of the Right to Organise 
and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service’.  It seeks to 
extend anti-union discrimination provisions to “public employees”.  
 
Novitz observes that Convention 87 and Convention 98 have been acclaimed as being 
amongst the ILO’s most “basic human rights Conventions”116 while Harold Dunning reflects 
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that each has become accepted as “integral” to the other.117  Geraldo von Potobsky questions 
the effectiveness of the collective labour standards that the Conventions purport to inspire.118  
He highlights the difficulties that those who might attempt to measure “success” will encounter 
and suggests that it is practically much easier to transfer the content of labour standards into 
national law within the context of the individual employment relationship.  Von Potobsky 
argues that changes to collective labour law impact much more directly upon (and can therefore 
be perceived as more of a threat to) established orders in individual societies, all of which 
exhibit their own cultural and historical characteristics and that it should not therefore come as 
any surprise that implementation of labour standards might be resisted in some quarters.119  
Despite his concerns regarding the effect of labour standards, he concedes that the ILO has 
been instrumental in the dissemination of the principle of freedom of association and that this 
has led directly to its practical implementation and acceptance around the globe.120 
 
The ILO sought to further strengthen its fundamental Conventions in its adoption of the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998.121  This effectively 
“wrapped up” all eight Conventions into four ‘fundamental principles and rights at work’, the 
first of which is ‘Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining’.122  It asserts that each ‘right’ is universal and so applies to all citizens in all member 
states, irrespective of the extent of their economic development.123  This means that even if 
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ILO members fail to ratify particular conventions, they are still obliged to respect and promote 
the fundamental principles that underpin them.   
 
Two supervisory bodies, the Committee of Experts and the tripartite Governing Body on 
Freedom of Association (CFA), play a prominent role in enforcement of the rights specified in 
Conventions 87 and 98.  Member states are required to submit biennial reports setting out the 
extent to which their domestic legislation and practice conforms to the obligations that the 
ILO’s Conventions place on them and these (together with accompanying comments from trade 
unions and employers’ organisations) are then examined by the Committee of Experts, which 
then comments both in the form of observations on fundamental questions raised by the 
application of a particular convention by a state that it publishes in an annual report and direct 
requests which relate to more technical questions or requests for further information that are 
not published, but which are conveyed directly to the governments concerned.124  The tripartite 
CFA considers complaints from both trade unions and employers’ associations relating to 
alleged breaches of Conventions 87 and 98.  This particular body meets privately and reaches 
unanimous decisions that it then summarises and publishes at regular intervals.  All of the 
CFA’s recommendations are forwarded to the Governing Body of the ILO so that it can 
determine whether further action is required.  The CFA also endeavours to co-operate with 
(and often refers matters to) the Committee of Experts.125 
 
The International Labour Office126 Director-General, Juan Somavía, reported on the 
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effect of freedom of association in employment globally at the 2008 International Labour 
Conference.  He maintained that the freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively remained 
fundamental “enabling” rights that were both rooted in the ILO’s constitution and periodically 
“reaffirmed” by the international community “to promote and realise decent conditions at 
work”.127  Global promotion and ratification of Conventions 87 and 98 had not only enshrined 
those rights in the domestic law of individual nation states but had also helped to foster a 
climate within which workers and employers could organise, engage in collective bargaining 
and themselves become “major tools for labour market governance”.128 
 
 
2.4 Collective Bargaining and Collective Agreements 
 
 
The ILO considers collective bargaining to be the activity or a process that culminates in 
the conclusion of a collective agreement129 and it provides for voluntary such processes in its 
Convention 98, ‘Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively’.  The EU has enshrined a 
separate formal ‘Right of collective bargaining and action’, which appears in Article 28 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and states that: 
 
“Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union 
law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective 
action to defend their interests, including strike action.” 
 
The Article 28 right was inspired by Article 6 of the CoE ‘Social Charter’ together with Points 
12 to 14 of the EU ‘Social Chapter’ and the ECtHR has also recognised that the right of 
collective action is an essential element of the trade union that are set out in Article 11 of the 
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Collective agreements essentially have two purposes.  The first of these is to set out 
procedures that a union and the employer agree to adhere to, while the second is to regulate 
workers’ terms and conditions.  Collective agreements made in the UK may or may not fall 
within the statutory definition of a collective agreement contained in the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA 1992), s178.  This states that: 
 
“(1) In this Act “collective agreement” means any agreement or arrangement made by or on 
behalf of one or more employers or employers’ associations and relating to one or more of 
the matters specified below; and “collective bargaining” means negotiating, relating to or 
connected with one or more of those matters. 
 
(2) The matters referred to above are: 
(a) terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers 
are required to work; 
(b) engagement or non-engagement, or termination or suspension of employment or the 
duties of employment, of one or more workers;  
(c) allocation of work or the duties of employment between workers or groups of workers;  
(d) matters of discipline; 
(e) a worker’s membership or non-membership of a trade union; 
(f) facilities for officials of trade unions; and 
(g) machinery for negotiations or consultation, and other procedures, relating to any of the 
above matters, including the recognition by employers or employers’ associations of the 
right of a trade union to represent workers in such negotiation or consultation or in the 
carrying out of such procedures. 
(3) In this Act, “recognition” in relation to a trade union means the recognition of the union 
by an employer or two or more associated employers, to any extent, for the purposes of 
collective bargaining and “recognised” and other related expressions shall be construed 
accordingly.” 
 
The statute contains a presumption that a collective agreement will not be binding unless it is 
in writing with an express clause to the contrary.130  The question of when a collective 
agreement becomes incorporated in an individual contract of employment rests on the facts of 
each particular case131 and it should be noted that the presence of a non-binding clause in an 
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agreement as between a union and an employer does not prevent the clause from becoming 
incorporated by reference as a term in an individual employee’s contract of employment.132 
 
Ewing argues that implementation of more widespread collective bargaining processes 
(in preference to any kind of “tinkering” with the current statutory recognition process in the 
UK to be discussed in Chapter Four of this dissertation) is bound to increase the effectiveness 
of trade unions with resulting improvements in employer-trade union engagement and 
increased numbers of collective agreements.133  For such bargaining to be sustained, however, 
a legislative framework must exist that provides for protections and guarantees as well as 
institutions that facilitate collective bargaining and address possible conflicts, efficient labour 
administrations and strong and effective workers’ and employers’ organisations.  While the 
global economic downturn that began in 2007-8 has prompted a number of (especially centre-
right) governments to call for some relaxation in employment protections (including trade 
union rights)134, US President Obama specifically rejected suggestions that collective 
bargaining rights threatened economic competitiveness when he unveiled proposals designed 
to boost jobs and the economy to Congress on 8 September 2011.135  
 
 
2.5 Trade Unionism 
 
Trade unions have been subject to legal regulation more or less since their inception and 
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it is widely accepted that it was not until the twentieth century that they were truly able to 
choose how to conduct their affairs (whether in terms of their dealings with their members or 
with employers and employers’ associations).136  The UK’s definition of a ‘trade union’ now 
appears in TULRCA 1992, s1 as follows: 
 
“… an organisation (whether temporary or permanent)--- 
 
(a) which consists wholly or mainly of workers of one or more descriptions and whose 
principal purposes include the regulations of relations between workers of that description 
or those descriptions and employers or employers’ associations; or 
 
(b) which consists wholly or mainly of--- 
(i) constituent or affiliated organisations which fulfil the conditions in paragraph (a) (or 
themselves consist wholly or mainly of constituent or affiliated organisations which fulfil 
those conditions), or 
(ii) representatives of such constituent or affiliated organisations, 
 
and whose principal purposes include the regulation of relations between workers and 
employers or between workers and employers’ associations, or the regulation of relations 
between its constituent or affiliated organisations. 
 
A body can only be deemed an ‘organisation’ if it can demonstrate that it possesses some kind 
of formal “structure” and is not simply a casual grouping of workers.137  As far as the 
‘regulation of workers as a principal purpose’ is concerned, the courts appear to have concluded 
that where palpable evidence of organisation and a desire to regulate activities (as between 
workers and employers or employers’ associations) can be demonstrated, then that will 
generally prove sufficient to establish an association as a trade union.138  TULRCA 1992, s1(b) 
also makes it clear that a body that is representative of a number of trade unions, such as the 
Trades Union Congress, may also be so categorised and it is also the case that where a union 
takes the form of a “collective” of different trades or exists in several different geographical 
areas, then it is perfectly legitimate for several constituent unions to operate within one main 
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union.139  The size of a union also has a significant bearing on the extent of any remedies and 
damages that may be awarded against it.140 
 
Once an association satisfies the ‘s1’ definition of a ’trade union’, it can apply to be 
entered on the list of trade union by the Certification Officer.141  Associations requesting to be 
listed are required, under TULRCA 1992, s3(2), to supply a copy of their rule book, a list of 
their officers, a head office address and the name that the association is to be known by 
(together with a registration fee).  The Certification Officer must add it to the list if he is 
satisfied that it meets all of the requirements contained in the definition in s1, that all of the 
formalities required under s3(2) have been met and that registration of the name of the applicant 
body is not prohibited on account of any similarity with another listed organisation (registered 
as a union either under the Trade Union Acts 1871-1964 or the Industrial Relations Act 
1971).142  The Certification Officer may remove a body from the list in circumstances where it 
has been listed but then appears in fact not to be a trade union143 or if he is satisfied that it 
actually no longer exists.144 145  Bodies can also request their own removal from the list.146  
Appeals against decisions of the Certification Officer, either to refuse entry to the list or to 
remove an entry may, following the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 2004, be 
made to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on a point of law only.147 
 
Bona fide trade unions must ensure that they obtain a Certificate of Independence.   This 
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ensures that “full” statutory (collective) rights are exercised only by truly independent bodies 
and not by staff associations (who could, for example, provide a much more likely means for 
an employer to impose “informal control” over the workforce).148  The Certification Officer 
“as an external measure to gauge independence” may also protect union members from 
employer interference aimed at preventing them from exercising their trade union rights.149  
TULRCA 1992, s5 states that a union will be independent for the purpose of the grant of a 
Certificate of Independence where it: 
 
“(a) is not under the domination or control of an employer or group of employers or of one 
or more employers’ associations, and 
 
 (b) is not liable to interference by an employer or any such group or association (arising out 
of the financial or material support or by any other means whatsoever) tending towards such 
control… ” 
 
The definition first tests whether the union is “simply an emanation of the employer” and then 
considers, if that is not the case, whether it could be “forced to defer to the wishes of an 
employer”.150  The first limb of the test requires the Certification Officer to consider a number 
of factors which originally came about as a result of the EAT’s deliberations in Blue Circle 
Staff Association v The Certification Officer.151  These include the union’s history (together 
with any relevant recent history of the relationship with managements), the breadth of the 
union’s membership base (a smaller base and presence in fewer employers potentially 
rendering a union more vulnerable to pressure from those employers), the union’s organisation 
and structure (including whether it has been “infiltrated” in any way by management), how it 
is financed (it must be self-supporting), whether it is in receipt of facilities provided by the 
employer and its record in negotiations.  The second component of the test152 is concerned with 
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the union’s ability to withstand external pressure from an employer and it can be applied at two 
alternative time points, namely that liability to interference should be considered at the time of 
the application for the Certificate of Independence (identified by Humphreys as the point 
favourable to the applicant union153) or the union could be considered to be liable to 
interference at some point in the future (identified by Humphreys as “obviously unfavourable 
to applicants” because of the scope that it affords the Certification Officer to speculate as to all 
manner of future eventualities154).  As with entry on and removal from the list of unions, 
Certificates of Independence can be both granted and revoked, on condition that specified 
criteria are met and subject to any appeal by the union to the EAT.155   
 
Trade unions perform a variety of functions for their members.  These include provision 
of workplace advice, representation of their collective interests in discussions with 
management, the negotiation of improvements in wages and working conditions and 
enforcement of members’ employment rights both at work and in employment tribunals and 
the courts.  More broadly, they purport to campaign against discrimination and in favour of 
equal opportunities, regularly lobbying central government and others in support of policies 
and legislation aimed at enhancing employment rights.156  Conversely, opponents of trade 
unions may argue that they in fact merely secure ‘rents’ for their members in the form of higher 
wages than they believe the free market would justify.157  An obvious attraction of collective 
bargaining to employers is that it can facilitate much more “streamlined” negotiation with a 
group or groups of workers, through their trade union(s) rather than with each and every 
individual employee.  This can of course give rise to some difficulty in as much that unions 
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remain essentially ‘majoritarian’ organisations and so may not always prove able to fully 
satisfy the demands, or even protect all of the interests, of every member.158 
 
 
2.5.1 Trade Union Recognition 
 
Formal recognition (both in law and by employers) is, of course, fundamentally important 
to trade unions who aspire to represent and bargain on behalf of their members in any effective 
sense.  Novitz and Skidmore state that: 
“Recognition is CENTRAL to British industrial relations.  Not only does recognition confer 
on unions certain basic statutory entitlements, but it is regarded as the door to collective 
bargaining and consultation rights.”159  
 
Bowers, Duggan and Reade further augment the definition of recognition to ensure that it 
specifically entails: 
“… the status of an independent trade union having a negotiating voice with the employers 
on behalf of its members for the purposes of collective bargaining.  This goes beyond merely 
being informed or consulted about decisions.” 160 
 
As has already been stated, this notion of ‘independence’ is absolutely fundamental as it is only 
after this has been established that the newly-confirmed union can fully assert its statutory 
rights. 
 
A trade union is said to be ‘recognised’ by an employer once the two have agreed to 
bargain in respect of employees’ terms and conditions.  The group of workers over whose 
conditions the two agree to negotiate becomes the ‘bargaining unit’.  Recognition brings with 
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it a number of legal rights and these typically include time off for representatives to enable 
them to discharge their union duties, time off for union members to participate in union 
activities, disclosure of information to representatives to enable them to participate more 
effectively in the process of collective bargaining with the employer and time off for union 
learning representatives with regard to employees’ training issues generally as well as to 
undertake training themselves in order that they can perform their duties.  Recognised 
independent trade unions also have the right to be consulted on such matters as health and 
safety issues, prospective redundancy exercises and proposals for the transfer of an employer’s 
business undertaking.  Recognition of trade unions in the UK can be effected either through a 
voluntary agreement between a trade union and an employer or, since the introduction of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA 1999), following initiation by an applicant union of a 
statutory procedure that includes an application for recognition to an adjudicating body, the 
Central Arbitration Committee.  The rationale for, and implementation and practical effects of, 
the UK’s provision for statutory recognition is discussed in much more depth in Chapters Four 
and Five of this dissertation.  
 
 
Summary 
 
Human rights organisations have had a huge influence on the development of rights of 
freedom of assembly and association, not only in society generally but also in the specific 
context of labour law and access of workers to trade union membership.  There are a number 
of essential characteristics that a trade union needs to exhibit if it is to properly take advantage 
of the protections that the law affords both to it and its members who participate in its activities.  
Independence from the employer is of crucial importance in enabling a union to fulfil its 
obligations and the legal framework that surrounds registration and the issue of the Certificate 
of Independence by the Certification Officer in the UK provides a degree of certainty and 
stability to associations seeking to operate as recognised trade unions.   
 
The contribution of the numerous national, regional and international instruments that 
make provision for freedom of association in employment has been hugely significant.  
Arguably the ILO’s principal “weakness” is that it is a voluntary organisation with only limited 
power to enforce its instruments in member countries.  However, while the ILO’s Conventions 
may not be “mandatory” (and so have no formal status, certainly in English Law), they have 
proved to be indispensable as levers for the promotion of minimum standards in - and the 
establishment of benchmarks for - the employment rights of member states’ citizens.  The peer 
pressure that exists between member states to respect those of the ILO’s provisions that address 
trade union rights and freedoms thus helps to ensure that protection of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining rights will almost certainly endure in one form or another.  A detailed 
analysis of the historical context and characteristics of the formal models of recognition for 
trade union activity that exist in the UK and in Australia will follow in the Chapters Three to 
Six, including the advantages and apparent drawbacks that exist in both.  
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LEGISLATION IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM PRIOR TO 1997 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Anne (ACL) Davies contrasts the stance of countries who have sought to “facilitate” 
trade unionism through the conferment of legal rights (enshrined, for the most part, in national 
constitutions) on their citizens with the approach of English Law.  She points to the latter’s 
focus having fallen on trade union organisations and the extent to which they have served as 
the principal means for protection of workers’ interests, resulting in the development of a 
system of statutory immunities designed to protect the unions against liabilities in tort against 
a background of sustained hostility from the judiciary that itself contributed to periodic 
statutory intervention by the legislature.161  The result of this conflict between competing 
“lawmakers” has been the creation and establishment of the legal framework for industrial 
relations that we know and understand today.   
 
Chapter Three offers a précis of how the UK’s employment and trade union-related 
legislation evolved from the 19th and into the latter part of the 20th centuries, its response to the 
clamour for collective bargaining and its inception of a legal framework designed to facilitate 
the formation and validation of trade unions and the “last” attempted introduction of a scheme 
for statutory recognition in the form of provisions contained within the Industrial Relations Act 
1971.  
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 3.1 19th Century Origins of Worker Organisation  
 
Prior to 1824, all attempts by workers to combine with the aim bringing about 
improvements in the terms of their employment were outlawed.  From the period following the 
Black Death and the Peasants Revolt through to the implementation of measures such as the 
Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 and the Master and Servant Act 1823, lawmakers’ 
overriding objective had been to maintain stability and order on employers’ terms.  This 
ensured that the principle that underpinned all legislation was that workers should be obedient 
and loyal to their employer.  Justices of the Peace could compel servants to work, applying 
criminal sanctions as they saw fit.  Conversely, any failure by a master to provide work was 
only punishable by the use of civil penalties.  Agreements proposed by workers that might 
enhance their pay and conditions were outlawed and judges maintained a conviction that any 
organisation of workers established with the intention of securing such advances itself 
amounted to a criminal conspiracy.162   
 
Humphreys argues that the Industrial Revolution, complete with its unforgiving working 
conditions and a consequential upsurge in industrial injuries, resulted in an acceptance that 
workers deserved greater workplace protection and a “decriminalisation” of trade union 
activity through the Combination of Workmen Act 1824 and the Combination Laws Repeal 
Amendment Act 1825 (reform that was, in truth, more “relative” than it was radical163).  
Unions’ internal organisations had become more effective and their more professional public 
image helped them to become more socially acceptable as it became more widely understood 
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that their prime objective was to improve working conditions rather (perhaps) than institute 
change throughout wider society.164   
 
The repeal of the Combination Acts allowed workers who were members of former 
‘friendly societies’ to organise openly and create what became known as ‘new unions’, even if 
the initial expansion in membership proved uneven across the country (often occurring on an 
urban or regional basis more than through “national” institutions).  Unions still enjoyed 
relatively little legal protection.  Prosecutions were frequent and punishments severe, 
culminating in the celebrated case of the ‘Tolpuddle Martyrs’, six agricultural labours who 
were sentenced to 7 years transportation in 1834 on a charge of administering ‘illegal oaths’.  
The Molestation of Workmen Act 1859 (MWA 1859) restricted the meaning of “molestation”, 
providing that it did not occur wherever a combination of workers sought to picket peacefully 
with the aim of convincing others that they should leave work to join lawful strike action and 
the Master and Servant Act 1867 changed the law again to make imprisonment of workers who 
were deemed to have individually breached their contracts of employment exceptional rather 
than customary.  Judicial attitudes, however, remained staunchly conservative throughout.165  
In Hornby v Close166, for example, it was held that trade unions remained unlawful whenever 
they sought to bring about increases in wage levels and organise workers because their actions 
amounted to a restraint of trade. 
 
 
3.1.1 The ‘Creation’ of Trade Unions in UK Law 
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Events such as the ‘Sheffield Outrages’ of 1886, which saw trade unionists accused of 
arson and murder to intimidate non-unionists and William Broadhead, the Secretary of the 
Sawgrinders’ Union, admit to ordering an employer’s murder, prompted the United Kingdom 
Alliance of Organised Trades (the forerunner of the Trades Union Congress) to argue that 
responsibility for those acts lay with individuals and that industrial relations would best 
improve if legal restrictions on union activity were removed.  The (Conservative) government 
responded with the establishment of a Royal Commission on Trade Unions in 1867.  A majority 
of its members determined that unions should be granted legal status on condition that they 
abandoned any rules that could be interpreted as being in restraint of trade but a vociferous 
minority refused to endorse the final report and published alternative findings.  These included 
the proposition that unions should not only be legalised but also given immunity in respect of 
acts committed in restraint of trade and any criminal consequences that might arise from those 
acts.  The minority report subsequently formed the basis of reforms introduced by Gladstone’s 
Liberal government in the form of the Trade Union Act 1871 (TUA 1871), Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1871 (CLAA 1871) and by Disraeli’s Conservative administration in its 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 (CPPA 1875).167 
 
TUA 1871 both provided that “the purposes of a trade union” should no longer be 
regarded as unlawful merely because that union acted in restraint of trade and effectively also 
removed the courts’ jurisdiction to exercise judgement over the unions’ internal affairs.  CLAA 
1871 repealed the remaining active provisions of the Combination Acts and MWA 1859, 
restricting the definition of ‘molestation’ to threats of violence and removing criminal liability 
for conspiracy where this involved performance of an act that was not itself illegal, but it 
actually also introduced new offences of criminal harassment which continued to be enshrined 
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in the law well into the 21st century and re-established picketing as a criminal offence.168  CPPA 
1875 then rendered collective bargaining and peaceful picketing lawful.  Its s17 repealed the 
Master and Servant Acts so that it was no longer a criminal offence for workers to withdraw 
their labour from their employer save in relation to certain prescribed cases (usually involving 
strikes that would endanger life or property or where the strike occurred within one of the 
former ‘public utilities’).  The Act also created a platform for the right to strike as it removed 
criminal liability from the acts of a workers’ conspiracy where this took place in furtherance 
or contemplation of a trade dispute, unless the acts themselves constituted criminal behaviour.  
The legislation that was introduced during this period is often looked upon as having formed 
the basis of “modern labour law”.169  Worker organisation had also built up considerable 
momentum by this point, culminating in the first meeting of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
in Manchester in 1868.170    
 
By 1901, trade unions had ceased, at least as far as legislation was concerned, to be 
regarded as unlawful.171  The judiciary, however, continued to subject trade unionists’ activities 
to rigorous examination through the common law.  The case of Quinn v Leathem172 featured a 
claimant who was an employer of non-union workers.  Both he and one of his major customers 
were advised by the defendant, a trade union activist, that they would both be subjected to 
industrial action unless the non-union employees were dismissed.  The customer revoked his 
purchase agreement with the claimant, who then sued the defendant in common law for the 
(economic) tort of conspiracy in respect of the loss that he sustained.  The House of Lords ruled 
in favour of the claimant and held that while a combination not to work was lawful, the same 
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exercise aimed at preventing others from working under circumstances such as described in 
Quinn was prima facie unlawful.  The Trade Disputes Act 1906 (TDA 1906) addressed issues 
raised in Quinn and granted unions statutory immunity from the consequences of particular 
economic torts that they may have committed while pursuing industrial action.  Dramatic 
increases in membership levels enabled unions to extend their political activities.  Some joined 
socialist groups resulting in the formation in of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 
(which would later evolve to become the Labour Party in 1906).  It offered direct assistance to 
unions penalised by court decisions during industrial disputes.  An infamous such ruling was the 
judgement of the House of Lords in Taff Vale Railway Company v Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants173, which appeared to violate provisions contained in TUA 1871.  The Taff 
Vale Railway Company successfully sued the union for damages in respect of financial loss it 
had incurred because of a strike.  The ruling posed a severe threat because it suggested that any 
strike would most likely result in a union losing some or all of its funds and the liability was 
only removed with the introduction of TDA 1906.  In Osborne v Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants174, the House of Lords held that it was illegal for a union to spend its funds 
on purposes other than those laid down in earlier legislation.  The Trade Union Act 1913 (TUA 
1913) reversed the ruling in Osborne and permitted unions, with their members’ consent, to 
establish separate political funds in order to pursue their political objectives.  
 
 
3.2 The Significance of the Post-Second World War Period, the Industrial Relations 
Act 1971 and Renewed Attempts at Control of Trade Union Activity 
 
The intervention of two World Wars and a concentration on post-conflict, global issues 
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took precedence over further reform of the UK’s trade union law until well into the 1960s.  
Society had, by then, undergone radical socio-economic change with escalations in inflation 
and unemployment and an expansion in population resulting in an upsurge in the number of 
people seeking work.  Workplaces had become more mechanised and this restricted the 
economy’s ability to absorb the increased demand for jobs.  Meanwhile, industrial relations at 
local levels had become increasingly strained as trade union officials sought to secure advances 
beyond the terms contained in nationally negotiated agreements and regularly employed tactics 
such as the ’wild cat’ strike to achieve their aims. 
 
The Wilson (Labour) government responded to the increase in unofficial strikes, wage 
inflation and claims of economically damaging “restrictive practices” with the establishment 
of the 1965 Royal Commission on Reform of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (the 
Donovan Commission) to consider the role of trade unions and employers’ associations and 
propose changes to industrial relations law with a view to the “acceleration (sic) of the social 
and economic advance of the nation”.175  Reporting in 1968, Donovan argued that employers 
failed to recognise the extent to which shop floor bargaining had threatened to supplant 
“traditional” industry-wide negotiations between employers and unions and had lost control of 
workplaces.  Reform of such local bargaining processes needed to take place through a system 
of recognition of employees’ elected representatives (shop stewards) and the establishment and 
implementation of binding agreements between employers and those representatives at plant 
and company level.176  Donovan formed the basis of the 1969 White Paper, ‘In Place of 
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Strife’.177  This included wider proposals to curb union power (including the introduction of 
mandatory strike ballots and the establishment of a body to enforce settlements of disputes) 
before the threat of a split within the Labour Party resulted in its abandonment.178 
The Donovan proposals resurfaced in the Heath (Conservative) government’s Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 (IRA 1971).  It purported to overhaul policy towards the unions as part of 
a wider “prices and incomes” approach179 and employed, according to Humphreys, a two-
pronged approach that granted individual rights to employees while exerting control over trade 
unions’ collective pursuits.  Moreover, it provided that unions could become registered, 
enabling them to become ‘corporate entities’ as has historically been the case in Australia but 
rendering them liable too to judicial scrutiny of their rulebooks.  Registration was not 
mandatory, but unions that chose to “comply” discovered that they would be “rewarded” with 
exclusive collective bargaining rights in respect of pay and conditions, bargaining information, 
tax benefits and (perhaps most crucially) immunity from any action in tort.180  Collective 
agreements between employers and trade unions were presumed to be binding in the absence 
of an express clause to the contrary and employers could enforce its provisions in the National 
Industrial Relations Court (NIRC 
 
Arguably the greatest significance of IRA 1971 is that, prior to the introduction of the 
Schedule A1 recognition scheme in ERA 1999, its enactment represented the only meaningful 
attempt by a UK government to introduce a “register” of trade unions.  It failed, largely, 
because most trade unions remained unwilling to co-operate with its provisions and chose to 
resist the “inducements” on offer to them (to register) but there was also a “secondary issue” 
                                                          
177 Cmnd 3888. 
178 BBC News, ‘Barbara Castle: Labour’s red queen’ (BBC News, 3 May 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/932237.stm> accessed 31 July 2012 
179 Humphreys (143) 6. 
180 ibid. 
of employers declining the opportunity that the legislation provided to seek recourse to the 
NIRC.  Humphreys also emphasises that emergency powers conferred on the government to 
enable it to apply to the NIRC for “cooling-off orders” to counter the threat of industrial action 
in emergency situations had only been invoked in one case, Secretary of State for Employment 
v ASLEF (No 2)181, where a pay dispute on the railways had resulted in a workers’ overtime 
ban and a work-to-rule182).  
 
 
3.2.1 The ‘Social Contract’ 
 
The Wilson (Labour) government elected in 1974 sought to maintain stability in 
workplaces by introducing its ‘Social Contract’.  This committed the government to seek to 
maintain full employment and provide certain social and employment benefits in return for the 
establishment of a prices and incomes policy, “backed” by a commitment from TUC that it 
would adopt a non-inflationary wage policy.183  Intended largely to bring about a restoration of 
the law as it had existed before IRA 1971, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
(TULRA 1974) became the first piece of legislation to be tabled “within” the Social 
Contract.184  The blanket exemption in relation to trade union liability in tort was 
reintroduced185, registration of unions was abolished186 and collective agreements were once 
more presumed (in the absence of a clause in a written agreement to the contrary) to be non-
legally binding.187   
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The Employment Protection Act 1975 (EPA 1975) represented a shift in the law’s 
emphasis to reflect the economic and social upheaval of the time and a balance between 
collective and individual employment rights.188  It established several important institutions, 
including the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS)189, the Certification 
Officer190, the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC)191 and the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(EAT)192 and specified that there should be compulsory arbitration in the case of disputes over 
trade union recognition193, that employers had a duty to disclose bargaining information to 
recognised unions194, that a trade union’s members were entitled to participate in the actions of 
that union during working hours195 and that officials of a trade union had the right to take time 
off work to enable them to carry out train union duties196 - all of which remain more or less 
intact today.197  Unions continued, however, to submit “above the rate of inflation” pay claims.  
They attempted to counter criticisms of their actions with the argument that it was left to their 
members to determine the extent of their wage demands and pointed out that government had 
failed to meet the demand for more progressive social measures.   
 
EPA 1975 itself proved only to a “partial success”.  A number of employers refused to 
co-operate with its provisions including the owners of Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories 
who, in a bitter dispute with their workforce over recognition that lasted from 1976 to 1978, 
refused to supply ACAS with workers’ names and addresses with the consequence that it was 
prevented from carrying out its statutory duty to ascertain employees’ views 198 and resulting 
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in the recognition process being frustrated.  Inter-union disputes (where more than one union 
claimed recognition on behalf of a group of workers), practical problems encountered by 
ACAS regarding the definition of bargaining units and persistent problems of delays in the 
process and continuing attempts by employers to interfere in the outcomes of individual ballots 
also combined and helped to render the Act far less effective than had been envisaged by those 
who drafted it. 199           
 
The Social Contract collapsed against the backdrop of a series of industrial disputes and 
strikes that combined to form the 1978-9 ‘Winter of Discontent’.  Humphreys argues that the 
period of the Social Contract represented the “high-water mark of the protection afforded (to 
the unions)… by law: they were immune from liability in tort in respect of the consequences 
of industrial action organised by them (including against third parties) and they had no 
restrictions on their taking of industrial action (save for that contained within their union 
rulebooks)”.200  Roy Lewis described the effect of conflicting changes introduced in the decade 
following the establishment of the Donovan Commission as one of “bewildering changes of 
pace and direction”.201  Anne Davies agrees that the true “legacy” of EPA 1975, together with 
other mid-1970s legislation that included measures designed to specifically target unfair 
dismissal and sex and race discrimination, represented a “redressing of the balance” away from 
collectivism towards individual employment rights even if she recognises that others, including 
(Lord) Bill Wedderburn, have looked upon these measures as having simply created a ‘floor of 
rights’ on which collective bargaining could build.202  
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3.2.2 Curbs on Trade Unions from the 1980s 
 
The Thatcher (Conservative) government elected in 1979 vowed that it would legislate 
to curb the unions’ influence.  Many Conservatives believed that trade unionists were a 
“corrupting effect on the operation of free markets, setting wage levels higher than they would 
be if left to negotiations between employers and individual employees”.203  The new 
administration signalled its intent in the Employment Act 1980 (EA 1980).  It provided that 
state funds could be made available to help pay the cost of union ballots204, that individual 
union members should have the right not to be unreasonably excluded or expelled from a trade 
union205, that immunity in tort for secondary picketing should be repealed206 and that certain 
trade union recognition machinery should also be repealed.207  The Employment Act 1982 (EA 
1982) introduced further constraints, including deeming unlawful dismissals of employees who 
were not union members in a closed shop where the existence of that arrangement had not been 
approved during the preceding five years by means of a secret ballot of the workforce208, the 
outlawing of “trade union labour only contracts“209, removal of the immunities that existed in 
tort actions against trade unions whilst protecting union assets held in provident benefit and 
political funds, the placing of a cap on the amount of damages that could be awarded against a 
union found to have committed a tort210 and a narrowing of the definition of what could 
lawfully constitute a ‘trade dispute’.211 
 
The Trade Union Act 1984 (TUA 1984) specified that “trade unions should be 
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democratic and exist for the benefit of their members”212.  It included stringent balloting 
requirements in respect of the conduct of elections for leadership offices213, the obligation to 
validate a call for industrial action by means of a ballot of the membership214 and a requirement 
that retention of a union’s ‘political fund’ should be verified by a ballot of members215.  Next, 
the Employment Act 1988 (EA 1988) embodied the government’s response to issues that 
surfaced during the 1984/5 Miners’ Strike216 and signified an acceleration of the Conservatives’ 
determination to restrict trade union operations.  It provided that proposed industrial action 
would need to be backed by a majority of members voting in favour in a ballot.217  Individual 
members were granted separate rights of access to the courts to challenge a union’s application 
of its rules218 and not to be unjustifiably disciplined by their union.219  They could also inspect 
the union’s accounts220 and control expenditure of funds by its trustees221  Meanwhile, 
provisions contained in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 
(TULRAA 1976) relating to automatically unfair dismissals as a consequence of individual 
employers’ ‘closed shop’ policies were repealed.222  Employees who could demonstrate that 
their employer had taken other discriminatory action short of dismissal against them on account 
of their union membership were granted a right of action223, while further detailed provisions 
in respect of certain union elections and ballots (on political funds and with regard to industrial 
action affecting different workplaces as well as the inclusion of a power to issue Codes of 
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Practice) were also set out.224   
 
The Employment Act 1990 (EA 1990) stated that discrimination by employers against 
job applicants on the ground of membership or non-membership of a trade union was 
unlawful225 and amended still further the law on balloting for industrial action.  It rendered 
trade unions vicariously liable for unlawful action of their officials where they (the unions) 
failed to condemn industrial action called by an official in the union’s name without proper 
authority226 and extended the power of the Secretary of State to issue Codes of Practice.227  The 
by now “complex bundle of rights and obligations for trade unions, trade union members and 
employers alike”228 was consolidated by the Major government into the TULRCA 1992, 
including a right for individuals not to be unreasonably denied membership of a trade union.229  
 
 
Summary 
 
UK industrial relations were, throughout most of the 20th century, characterised by 
engagement between employers, employees (represented through trade unions) and the state 
through a ‘tripartite’ system.  There existed, within that legal framework, a general consensus 
between politicians, employers and trade unions that endured right up until the late 1960s and 
which commanded that (save for circumstances of war or some other sustained national 
emergency) industrial relations and the law should not become intertwined.  It was this 
sometimes complicated arrangement that Kahn-Freund sought to illustrate in his analysis of 
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collective laissez-faire.  The subsequent (if short-lived) inception of IRA 1971, the 
establishment of the ‘Social Contract’ and the tranche of hostile measures introduced in the 
UK after 1979 deviated from (it could be said, entirely undermined) Kahn-Freund’s 
submissions. 
  
Mechanisms for legal recognition of trade unions were perceived as a threat to trade 
union autonomy rather than support for collective bargaining and neither unions nor employers 
wholeheartedly embraced attempts at state regulation of collective bargaining. At the same 
time, the law shielded unions from legal challenges to their actions and this led Khan-Freund 
to alter his evaluation of union autonomy.  He shifted his emphasis away from the need to 
permit collective negotiations and instead began to worry about who could protect the public 
interest within a laissez-faire system that afforded trade unions considerable freedom of action.  
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The various models of trade union recognition that exist across the developed world 
reflect the cultures and histories of individual nations as much as the direct influence of each 
of their legal systems.  Chapter One of this study examined some of the most significant 
influences on the UK’s recognition model as it evolved throughout the 20th century, including 
Otto Kahn-Freund’s ‘abstentionist’ theory and the wider establishment’s enthusiasm for the 
‘laissez-faire’ kind of approach to industrial relations that his philosophy would help to 
promote before it was punctuated briefly (during the 1970s) by the more “interventionist” 
‘Social Contract’.  Government intervention and oversight was, by and large, constrained and 
employers and trade unions were left to operate more or less free of interference.  Workers’ 
pay and benefits were determined by collective bargaining and considerations of the economic 
market leaving the state “confined”, usually, to the role of “arbiter” in relation to complaints 
regarding alleged breaches of rules and provider of a framework within which political funds 
could be maintained, mergers could take place and the independence of trade unions could be 
certified. 
 
The Social Contract, favoured by the Wilson and Callaghan (Labour) governments from 
1974 to 1978, took the form of a bi-partite agreement with trade unions and was designed to 
address the economic difficulties of the period.  Described by some as “a high point of trade 
union influence”230, it purported to control inflation through prices regulation, sought to 
implement industrial (stimulus) policies aimed at increasing employment levels and aimed to 
bring about improvements in the “social wage” through redistributive fiscal measures and a 
shift in public spending priorities.  Improvements to welfare benefits and more stringent 
controls on food prices and housing rents were introduced but inflation continued to spiral, 
placing severe pressure on the voluntary policy of wage restraint.  The economic crisis 
continued to deepen and the government withdrew the earlier subsidies.  The Social Contract 
increasingly became looked upon by unions as another means of depressing their members’ 
incomes and the eventual consequence was the campaign of industrial action during 1978-79 
that has popularly become known as the “winter of discontent”.  From 1979, first Conservative 
and then Labour governments returned to the more traditional, “hands-off”, approach to 
industrial relations, albeit with differing policy objectives. 
 
Chapter Three of this study considered how legislation, judicial decisions and academic 
theory combined to form the “character” of the UK’s approach to workplace industrial relations 
through to the post-Second World War period.  Chapters Five and Six will analyse the 
legislative changes introduced by Labour governments from 1997 that impacted upon and 
“revised” the UK’s union recognition ‘model’.  Other nations have, unsurprisingly, adopted 
different approaches to these kinds of issues.  An appraisal of some of those alternative 
methodologies may, through means of comparison, help to inform our conclusions regarding 
the extent to which the UK has shown itself able to address the various issues surrounding 
union recognition during periods of both economic and political change.  Chapter Four 
examines how Australia made recognition of trade unions an intrinsic component of its 
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industrial relations beginning with the establishment of a nationwide conciliation and 
arbitration system around the turn of the 20th century.   In so doing, it distinguished its approach 
from that taken by the UK, which conspicuously failed to include any provisions for union 
recognition in its employment legislation until the introduction of the Employment Relations 
Act 1999.  Australia’s recognition law serves as an obvious comparator to that in the UK 
because of its history as a settler colony of the British Empire and the longstanding similarities 
between the two jurisdictions before and after the advent of Australian independence around 
the turn of the 20th century. 
 
 
4.1 Why Australia’s Model? 
  
The UK and Australian recognition models are natural comparators.  The two countries’ 
shared heritage dictated that both would adopt the ‘Westminster’ parliamentary system of 
government to manage their respective legislatures.  A history of industrialisation helped to 
spawn workplace trade union activism in both countries and there have been parallels in the 
nature and effect of some of the changes in legislation that have been introduced in both 
countries over the last couple of decades.  There are, however, also distinct and highly 
significant differences between the two systems.  The right to representation by a trade union 
to an employer has remained integral within Australia’s highly regulated industrial relations 
regime since 1904, while the UK model – prior, at least, to the election of the first of the Blair 
Labour governments in 1997 – was renowned for its adherence to its almost “anarchic” 
collective laissez- faire principles and failure to bestow upon unions any right of recognition 
that was enshrined in law.  An analysis of both recognition models can assist in our 
comprehension of the common themes that endure within Australian and UK law, an 
appreciation of the motivation and/or reasoning for the quite different approaches to the issues 
that legislators in both countries may have adopted – whether through choice or “necessity” – 
leading to greater overall understanding of the relative positions today of Australian and UK 
trade union organisations within their respective, wider employer-employee relationships.231 
 
The Australian establishment’s reluctance to sanction provision for freedom of 
association in the context of union organisation and the consequential obligation that this has 
placed on unions to seek ‘registered organisation’ status so that they can participate in the 
settlement of industrial disputes contrasts with the ‘collective laissez-faire’ system that 
developed in the UK.  The basis for Australia’s modern-day guarantee of freedom of 
association for its trade unionists can be found in several international sources, ranging from 
the ICCPR and the ICESER to the various ILO instruments that its government and employers 
are obliged to observe.  Colin Fenwick suggests, however, that the Australian federal 
authorities’ concentration on the implementation of latter-day international legal obligations 
should not distract from the fact that none of those instruments have themselves exerted any 
meaningful influence over the substantive content of Australian recognition law and that the 
process through which Australia’s labour laws evolved actually began around the turn of the 
20th century with the introduction by the Commonwealth Parliament of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 (Conciliation Act).232   
 
Wilkinson, Bailey and Mourell point to the development by Australia of a “hybrid” 
industrial relations system characterised by the institution of minimum standards consequent 
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upon awards made by arbitrators.  The creation of these “thresholds” afforded widespread 
protection to workers and enabled unions to participate in collective bargaining where they 
were able to wield sufficient “market power”.233  The evolution of Australian industrial 
relations regulation to 2007 could be separated into three distinct, historical phases.  The first 
(and lengthiest) was the period that has become known as ‘the Australian settlement’, which 
lasted from 1904 to 1982.  This was followed by an arguably more ‘quasi-corporatist’ kind of 
approach under federal Labor (ALP) administrations from 1983 to 1996 ahead, finally, of the 
implementation of increasingly neo-liberal policies by John Howard’s Liberal-National 
coalition government between 1996 and 2007.234  Further legislation would be introduced by 
the Kevin Rudd-led ALP government in the form of its Fair Work Act 2009 and the effects of 
that reform will also be assessed later in this chapter. 
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4.2 20th Century Development of Australian Recognition Mechanisms 
 
Jeff Shaw, a former New South Wales Attorney-General and Minister for Industrial 
Relations, argues that Australia’s “traditional” approach to union recognition - founded on the 
premise that unions should be recognised simply by virtue of their registration under federal 
industrial relations legislation - has been much more straightforward than that adopted in the 
United Kingdom.235  The Commonwealth Parliament ushered in its ‘arbitral model’ in the 
Conciliation Act to form the basis for regulation of the employment relationship.  It remained 
in place as the principal component of federal industrial relations legislation for more than 80 
years until the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (IRA 1988), that would 
itself be supplanted by the Howard governments’ Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and  
Workplace Relations Amendment Act 2005 (Cth) (commonly referred to as ‘WorkChoices’). 
 
The Conciliation Act was introduced following a series of strikes and a severe economic 
depression during the 1890s.  The response of many employers to these events was to refuse to 
recognise or bargain with unions while the state’s common law continued to impose civil, and 
often criminal, penalties on participants in collective industrial action.  Australia evolving 
through a process of political federation and its Constitution came into effect upon the 
country’s independence from Britain in 1901.  Domestic manufacturers lobbied for the 
imposition of tariffs to help bolster the recovering economy while trade unionists and liberal-
minded lobbyists argued for increased social protection through the introduction of guaranteed 
wage thresholds and state-sponsored mechanisms to settle disputes.  The basis for the 
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Conciliation Act (and the “arbitral model” that emerged from it) was the Australian 
Constitution’s ‘industrial relations power’, which was set out in Section 51(xxxv).  This 
permitted the Federal Parliament to institute, through legislation, a system of public-sponsored 
conciliation and arbitration “for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one state”.  Its primary objective was to encourage collective 
bargaining through voluntary agreements between employers and unions or, failing that, 
conciliated settlements through a compulsory arbitration mechanism.  The legislation aimed to 
eliminate the possibility of strikes and lockouts and its architects hoped that collective groups 
of employers and employees would readily settle their differences by conciliation and 
agreement, probably on an industry-wide basis.236 
   
A basic tenet of the Conciliation Act was that unions did not need to gain recognition 
from employers.  They were instead recognised by the state through a system of registration, 
which meant that they could notify a dispute with an employer (or employer association) and 
then invoke the compulsory conciliation and arbitration mechanism.  Unions could request the 
imposition of awards on employers by tribunals and registered unions were also able to make 
enforceable collective agreements with employers.237  The Conciliation Act introduced the rule 
of law in industrial relations for the whole nation through the establishment of the 
‘Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration’, which was vested with powers to 
prevent and settle disputes both as a provider of conciliation and mediation services designed 
to promote amicable agreements between the parties and act as an arbitrator in circumstances 
where such voluntary accords could not be reached.  It was envisaged that the Court would also 
adjudicate on any disputes that were referred to it by individual states and that both it and the 
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various state industrial authorities that were in existence would co-operate with (and support) 
each other.  Minimum standards in employment and improvements to them that were more 
usually subject to collective bargaining in other countries tended to be determined by an 
evolving regime of tribunals both at the federal level and in individual states.238    
 
 
One of the most significant consequences arising from the formation of federal Australia 
was that state customs barriers were abolished, resulting in the transportation of large amounts 
of subsidised coal from New South Wales (NSW) to Victoria.239  Victorian coal mining 
companies located at Jumbunna and Outtrim gave notice that they intended to reduce wages in 
order that they could remain competitive with the cheaper NSW coal.  This inspired the 
workforce to form the Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (VCMA) and begin a recognition 
strike that lasted for 70 weeks.  The employer mining companies refused to recognise the 
VCMA and the defeated strikers eventually returned to work, whereupon they were subjected 
to harassment and/or dismissal simply because of their union membership.  The VCMA applied 
to the Industrial Registrar of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission for registration as a 
federal organisation with the expectation that it would be able to use registered status to obtain 
“federal award coverage” to protect its members pay rates and invoke provisions in the 
Conciliation Act designed to prevent victimisation of employees who were members of trade 
unions.  The employers challenged the registration provisions in Jumbunna Coal Mine, No 
Liability v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (‘Jumbunna’).240  The company owners argued 
that Parliament had exceeded its powers by conferring the status of corporations on registered 
associations, which invested them with the power to hold property and to sue for fees and 
contributions.  They also submitted that these incidents and powers were inseparable from the 
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scheme of registration and that as this was such a vital part of the Conciliation Act, then the 
whole enactment was unconstitutional and void.  The Jumbunna case effectively became a test 
of whether Australian workers had the right to be represented by a trade union during industrial 
disputes and therefore assumed huge significance. 
 
The employers’ arguments in Jumbunna were rejected by the High Court, which decided 
that unions and employer organisations had the right to register under this federal legislation 
specifically for the purpose of becoming the recognised representatives of their members’ 
interests.  The presiding judge, Justice O’Connor, stressed that for the Commonwealth’s 
conciliation and arbitration power to be effective in bringing about the settlement of disputes, 
representative bodies purporting to represent groups of workers (and not individuals) needed 
to enjoy standing.241  Accordingly, he held that: 
“The end aimed at by the Act in question here is the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
extending beyond any one state by conciliation and arbitration. It may well be conceded that there 
is no general power to prevent and settle industrial disputes by any means that the legislature may 
think fit to adopt. The power is restricted to prevention and settlement by conciliation and 
arbitration. Any attempt to effectively prevent and settle industrial disputes by either of these means 
would be idle if individual workmen and employees only could be dealt with. The application of 
the ‘principle of collective bargaining’ not long in use at the time of the passing of the Constitution, 
is essential to bind the body of workers in a trade and to ensure anything like permanence in 
settlement. Some system was therefore essential by which powers of the Act could be made to 
operate on representatives of workmen, and on bodies of workmen, instead of individuals only. But 
if such representatives were merely chosen for the occasion without any permanent status before 
the court, it is difficult to see how the permanency of any such settlement of a dispute could be 
assured. Even when the dispute is at the stage when it may be prevented or settled by conciliation, 
the representative body must have the right to bind and the power to persuade not only the 
individuals with whom the dispute has arisen, but the ever changing body of workmen that 
constitute the trade.”242 
 
Shaw has suggested that the High Court‘s affirmation of the registration provisions within the 
Conciliation Act represented the acknowledgement of a “unique status” conferred on unions 
within the conciliation and arbitration system as successful registration resulted in automatic 
recognition (by employers) and the capacity to operate meaningfully within the Australian 
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industrial relations system.  Some of these arguments were developed further many years later 
by Justice Fullagar in Williams v Hursey.243  He held that successful registration by a trade 
union as an “organisation” under the Conciliation Act conferred upon it “a corporate character” 
and “an independent existence as a legal person”.  He emphasised that this “(legal) personality” 
was something that was quite distinct from the all or any members of the union and that it 
remained constant irrespective of any changes in membership that might take place over time.  
The extent to which Australian unions were able to use their registered status to protect and 
enhance the working conditions of their members was discussed in Burwood Cinema Limited 
v Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees Association244, where it was held that an 
industrial relationship could exist between a federally registered union and employers who did 
not employ members of the union when the demands made by the union concerned the relations 
between its members, present and future, and those employers (who could not refuse to 
recognise unions or by-pass the federal award system simply by refusing to employ union 
members).  Further, in Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering 
Union245, the High Court held that a union could validly create an industrial dispute in respect 
of the working conditions of employees who were not its members.  Shaw has concluded that 
the registration process effectively served to ensure that Australia’s unions had become an 
integral part of the industrial relations system and were “recognised as being much more than 
merely agents of their members in that they (stood) in the place of their members and (acted) 
on their behalf.”246 
 
Breen Creighton argues that the ‘’registration system became “deeply embedded in the 
national psyche” to such an extent that by early as 1945, the vast majority of workers found 
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that their basic terms and conditions were regulated by the federal and state authorities’ 
industrial tribunals.247  However, he also stresses that the essence of the Australian model was 
that there were no lawful means whatsoever through which unions could take industrial action 
until 1929 (when blanket prohibitions of strikes and lockouts were removed).  Although unions 
remained both liable under the common law and subject to the numerous statutory provisions 
that continued to render virtually all industrial action unlawful, such behaviour did become 
more commonplace but legal sanctions were rarely invoked.248  The system of conciliation and 
arbitration established through the Conciliation Act (and corresponding legislation in the 
individual States) continued in operation until well into the 1980s, but Creighton concludes 
that what largely became a reliance upon tribunal awards (following referral of disputes by 
either of the parties involved in a dispute) ultimately served to undermine the development of 
collective bargaining through the kind of ‘joint regulation (as between the parties)’ or 
“collective laissez-faire” kind of approach traditionally practised in countries such as the 
UK.249  
 
 
4.3 Federal Labor’s ‘Third Way’ Approach (1983-96) 
 
Whether by “accident” or design, arguably the first manifestation of what became known 
as the ‘third way’ occurred in Australia in 1983 when a new ALP government was elected.250  
Having concluded a ‘Prices and Incomes Accord’ with the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) with the specific aim of assuaging more voters’ concerns before the election, ALP 
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ministers sought to implement structural economic reforms and began to more openly embrace 
the use of “market mechanisms” in their industrial policy.251  Creighton believes that the 
conciliation and arbitration system had, by that point in time, become over-centralised.  Terms 
and conditions had largely become determined by ‘over-award’ bargaining (where arbitrated 
awards were used as a starting point for negotiation of additional benefits) and the business 
lobby had been pressing for “greater flexibility”.252   
 
ALP governments from 1983 (led first by Bob Hawke and then by Paul Keating) sought 
to shift the focus away from centralised awards to collective bargaining at the “enterprise level” 
although the system of awards was maintained in the form of a ‘no-disadvantage test’, which 
decreed that enterprise agreements would only have effect if their terms were at least as 
advantageous for employees as those of any otherwise applicable award.253  The Hawke 
government finally replaced the Conciliation Act with IRA 1988 and the Keating 
administration then accelerated the process through the introduction of the Industrial Relations 
Legislation Amendment Act 1992 and the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (IRRA 1993).  
In addition to a simplification of the negotiation process for employers and unions, IRRA 1993 
provided legal protection for industrial action during negotiations.  However, it also enabled 
employers to conclude non-union collective agreements known as Enterprise Flexibility 
Agreements (EFAs) with employees for the first time (it should be emphasised though that 
some means of participation remained as employers were required to notify all ‘eligible unions’ 
that they intended to conclude an EFA, and that a union could then play an active role if one 
or more employees were members or any other employees indicated that they wished it to 
represent them254).  IRRA 1993 also introduced into IRA 1988, the power for the Australian 
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Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to make orders “for the purpose of ensuring that the 
parties negotiating an agreement do so in good faith”.255  These intervention powers appeared 
to be wide-ranging, but the AIRC itself held in both Public Sector, Professional, Scientific 
Research, Technical, Communications, Aviation and Broadcasting Union v Australian 
broadcasting Commission (ABC Case)256 and Asahi Diamond Industrial Australia Pty Ltd v 
Automotive, Food, Metals and Engineering Union257 that any the authority was merely 
“facilitative” and that while it could order parties to meet and confer, they could not be 
compelled to bargain.   
 
One interpretation of the effect of what Wilkinson et al describe as the “hybrid quasi-
corporatism” practised under the Hawke and Keating governments258 is that the award 
structure, for so long the foundation of federal industrial relations, was relegated to become 
little more than a “safety net”.259  Meanwhile, some state governments were framing legislation 
which enabled employers within those jurisdictions to bargain with individual employees and 
so avoid established collective “routes”.260  The first of John Howard’s Liberal/National Party 
coalitions resolved that it would make EFAs and certain initiatives that had already been taken 
in some states centrepieces of its legislative programme following its 1996 federal election 
victory.  
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4.4 Pro-Employer Legislation under ‘Howard Governments’  
 
The earliest and most significant legislative enactment by first Howard government was 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA 1996).  It was the first piece of legislation to make 
significant use of the Constitution’s ‘Section 51(xx)’ “corporations power”261 and it sought to 
attach stricter conditions to union recognition rights.  Supported by the Workplace Relations 
Regulations 1996 (the legislative instrument necessary for its effective operation), it set out a 
more rigorous process that trade unions would need to follow if they were to secure 
representative capacity.  A union would first need to file an application for registration.262  
Notice of the application would be published and circulated to interested parties263, who could 
then object to the registration.264  Only then might formal registration (by the AIRC) take 
place.265  Other measures introduced by WRA 1996 included: 
 Provision for individual contracting in the form of ‘Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWAs); 
 the creation of an Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA) to scrutinise and register 
agreements; 
 a reduction in the AIRC’s influence, so that it became merely one means through which 
disputes could be resolved; 
 simplification of awards through an ‘Award Simplification Taskforce’; and 
 restrictions on unions’ right of entry into workplaces as well as tighter constraints 
governing their internal rules and procedures.   
 
Arguably the most controversial measure (and the one which struck right at the heart of 
recognised trade unionism) was the AWA, the formal instrument designed specifically to 
exclude Australia’s trade unions from the bargaining process.266  While its stated aim may have 
been to “provide more effective choice and flexibility for employers and employees in reaching 
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agreements”267, the threat that it presented to trade unions was obvious.  Negotiations were 
permitted either on an individual or a collective basis but once these were completed, each 
employee was deemed to have made (and was required to sign) an individual written agreement 
with the employer, which was then registered with the OEA.  AWAs specified terms and 
conditions of employment and were required to include a dispute resolution procedure.  Each 
one also had to pass a ‘no disadvantage test’ (which involved a comparison with some relevant 
other award registered with the OEA).  Terms contained within individual AWAs could take 
precedence over conditions of employment set out in state or territory legislation save for any 
provisions which had been made with regard to occupational health and safety, workers’ 
compensation or training arrangements.  Each one was to have a maximum duration of three 
years and participation in industrial action in respect of any matter contained in each agreement 
was forbidden throughout its entire lifetime. 
 
WRA 1996 restricted the role of the AIRC so that it could only arbitrate to solve a dispute 
in circumstances where industrial action posed a significant threat to the national economy or 
the community’s health and safety or to prevent industrial action outside a bargaining 
“window”.  It was also put in charge of the award simplification process and the content of 
awards was limited to 20 ‘allowable matters’ (or core employment conditions) including leave, 
working hours and pay.  Only minimum wage rates could be specified in new awards.  The 
effect of all of these changes was that the AIRC’s arbitral powers were clearly and significantly 
weakened268 while severe constraints were placed on union activities and collective bargaining 
processes (which were restricted through the imposition of limits on union right of entry into 
workplaces and by allowing employers to refuse to negotiate with union representatives).  
Mirroring measures similar to those introduced by the UK’s Conservative governments during 
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the 1980s, WRA 1996 exposed unions and their members to fines in the event that they failed 
to comply with more restrictive strike balloting procedures or give the requisite length of notice 
to employers ahead of any industrial action, while participation in secondary boycotts and 
strikes was also made unlawful.  Awards could not include any matter that enabled union 
activity to take place and employers were given additional powers to lock out employees as a 
means of pressuring them into signing individual agreements.269  Opposition to the 
government’s reform programme mounted including the 1998 ‘Waterfront Dispute’ (described 
by Wilkinson et al as “the most significant dispute in many decades”270) arose when Patrick 
Stevedores, the largest employer on the Australian waterfront, attempted to de-unionise its 
workforce through means of dismissal and a lockout.  In Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 
Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia271, the union fought a largely successful High Court 
action against the company resulting in the eventual conclusion of a negotiated settlement.  The 
government was more successful though in a series of cases affecting unions in other sectors 
of the economy including banking, telecommunications and the public sector.  This led to a 
further decline both in union membership and in days lost to the economy through industrial 
action.  
 
 
4.5 ‘WorkChoices’ 
 
The Liberal-National coalition government led by John Howard was re-elected for a 
fourth term in 2004.  Federal ministers promptly commissioned a further review of the 
country’s industrial relations laws leading to the publication of further highly contentious 
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proposals designed to restrict collective bargaining and unions’ ability to organise in 
workplaces.  WRA 1996 as amended by the Workplace Relations Amendment Act 2005 
(known as ‘WorkChoices’) became the new cornerstone of Australian federal industrial 
relations legislation.  The Workplace Relations Regulations 2006, required to ensure that 
WorkChoices could function effectively, repealed their 1996 predecessors although many of 
them actually replicated, with amendments, some of those redundant provisions.  WorkChoices 
sought to implement the government’s objective of moving towards a single national system 
of regulation, first through the expansion of the federal system to cover most employers and 
then by ensuring that those employers were not subject to state awards or agreements and 
certain other state employment laws.  It has been criticised by Mary Gardiner as having been 
“introduced in haste”272 and for being “a curious mixture of government retreat from the labour 
market and government intervention”273 and by Andrew Stewart on account of its apparent 
inconsistencies and shortcomings in content.274  Richard Hall suggests that its passing (in 
December 2005) represented “the most fundamental revolution in industrial relations since 
federation.”275 
 
The amendments introduced by WorkChoices included:  
 The replacement, for ‘federal system’ employers, of the separate State and federal 
industrial relations systems with a single national system; 
 the establishment of a new Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) to take on the 
responsibility for determination of minimum wage levels that had until then been 
exercised by the AIRC; 
 the process through which Certified Agreements (between employers and trade unions 
acting on behalf of employees) and AWAs was simplified; 
 responsibility for supervision of the certification process was transferred from the 
AIRC to a new statutory agency, the Workplace Authority; 
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 the maximum duration of Certified Agreements and AWAs was increased from three 
to five years; 
 abolition of the ‘no disadvantage test’ introduced by the Keating government and 
already amended by WRA 1996; 
 unfair dismissal protections were weakened on the ground of “business need” and an 
exemption was introduced for companies employing fewer than 101 workers; 
 further restrictions were placed on employees’ ability to take allowable industrial 
action; 
 the introduction of compulsory secret ballots for industrial action; 
 the introduction of a prohibition on ‘pattern bargaining’ (where unions were able to 
conclude an enhanced settlement with one employer and use it as a benchmark to 
negotiate similar or improved agreements with other employers) and industry-wide 
industrial action.  
 
The transfer of responsibility for agreement certification to the new Workplace Authority 
raised concerns that more restrictions would be placed upon unions who sought to object to 
“unsatisfactory” content in agreements.  Employers were no longer obliged to negotiate new 
collective agreements with employees or their representatives, regardless of the number of 
union members in a workplace or bargaining unit and/or those members’ preference for such 
an agreement.  The simplification of the process leading to the establishment of Certified 
Agreements and AWAs and the decision to increase their respective maximum durations 
provoked a furious reaction from the ACTU and its allies.  It complained that the AWA was a 
thinly veiled attack on employees’ conditions of service and that it was designed to destroy the 
unions’ ability to participate in collective bargaining.  Trade unions maintained that individual 
employees could not raise the necessary bargaining strength to ensure fair treatment by their 
employer and that the safeguards offered by existing laws in respect of equity in bargaining 
and minimum standards in employment offered only scant consolation when set against the 
entrenched disadvantages for employees that inevitably arose out of the AWAs.  Individual 
unions reminded members that the new laws did not compel workers to accept individual 
contracts or AWAs and urged anyone who had been offered one by the employer to seek advice 
with a view to appointing the union as his or her bargaining agent.276 
 
The ACTU and is allies responded to WorkChoices with a vigorous and highly effective 
public campaign of opposition under the banner, ‘Your Rights at Work’.277  Spread over several 
months, it included a series of rallies, marches and demonstrations as well as television and 
radio advertisements, legal challenges and extensive use of the internet.  The campaigners 
seized upon a comment by Howard himself (Alison Barnes refers to it as a “telling slip”278) 
who, when interviewed on 7 July 2005, had said, “We’re not governing for the unions, we’re 
governing for the employers”.  The government pressed ahead with its introduction of its 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 (Cth) into Parliament at the 
beginning of November 2005.  Although the ACTU resolved that it would campaign against 
WorkChoices for as long as proved necessary to overturn the new laws279, the Bill passed 
quickly through the House of Representatives and the Senate and received the Royal Assent on 
14 December 2005.  In seeking to create its national system of regulation, the federal 
government knew that it was able to override legislation passed by the Northern Territory or 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Parliaments, but its ability to so act with regard to laws 
passed by states was restricted to matters that could truly be said to be “national concerns”.  It 
therefore used Section 51(xx) (the “corporations power”) of the Constitution as its authority to 
extend the range of the federal industrial relations system280, causing consternation in the state 
Labor governments throughout the country.  The introduction of the WorkChoices bill in 
Canberra had prompted the State Premier of Queensland, Peter Beattie to say, “Industrial 
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relations and a sensible state system has helped to give us… stability, we don't want a federal 
system that will wreck it.  Under those circumstances, unless the legal advice advises otherwise, 
we will challenge it in the High Court.”281  Despite widespread objections, the new legislation 
came into force on 27 March 2006 and the states’ challenge to the constitutional legitimacy of 
WorkChoices was eventually rejected by the High Court in in NSW v Commonwealth282, where 
it was held that the Constitution’s Section 51(xx) did indeed provide a sound legal basis for the 
legislation. 
 
Mary Gardiner has argued that as an attempt by Howard’s ministers to “micro-manage 
industrial relations”, WorkChoices proved toxic not only to the unions, state Labor 
governments, academics, and church and community groups who resented its “blatant anti-
employee bias”, but also to neo-liberal groups who abhorred the government’s decision to go 
back on earlier promises that any legislation would signify a complete withdrawal from the 
workplace and leave employers and employees to organise “without interference”.283  She 
argues that the overriding purpose of WorkChoices may have been to strengthen the hand of 
employers with each one of its amendments handing more power to them at the expense of 
employees, but the extent to which it compelled them to disadvantage the unions and individual 
employees in workplace agreements alienated many of those who perhaps ought to have been 
amongst its most fervent supporters.  The almost complete lack of consensus undoubtedly 
undermined WorkChoices’ prospects of success in the longer term284 and its insistence that 
collective bargaining between employers and trade unions should be prohibited created many 
practical problems.  Even employers who believed that they enjoyed good relations with 
relevant unions and wanted to include union-related provisions (including the entitlement to 
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facility time, the right of entry and the payroll deduction of subscriptions) in a workplace 
agreement were prevented from doing so by the legislation. 
 
WorkChoices retained the process of registration (which had proved so crucial to the 
fortunes of Australian unions and the means through which they secured their original 
entitlement to recognition around the time of federation) in the Registration and Accountability 
of Organisations Schedule that formed Schedule 1 of WRA 1996 but unions who sought to 
register now had to satisfy one of two criteria.  Employer associations were required to have a 
majority of members who were federal system employers, while the unions had to have a 
majority of members who were employed (or engaged) by those employers.  In the event that 
this membership requirement could not be satisfied, a second opportunity was available if the 
association or union could demonstrate that it was a constitutional corporation (which would 
require it to have lawfully acquired corporate status) and that it could be characterised as a 
‘trading’ or ‘financial’ corporation.  The new measures inevitably called the ability of unions 
to retain their registrations into serious question285, in part because the question of whether a 
union could be a trading corporation had been raised but had not then been decided in Rowe v 
TWU286 some years earlier.  Finally, WorkChoices sought to increase opportunities for 
‘constituent parts’ of an amalgamated organisation to seek to withdraw from the 
amalgamation287 with disaffected branches or sections being given three years (in the case of 
pre-1997 amalgamations) or five years (for those that had occurred later than that) to apply to 
the Industrial Relations Commission for a withdrawal ballot.  
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4.5.1 From ‘WorkChoices’ to the Fair Work System 
 
The campaign mounted by the ALP and ACTU proved so effective that the Howard 
administration decided to abandon its “WorkChoices” branding in May 2007.  The ACTU 
retorted that the WorkChoices laws themselves remained virtually unchanged288 and it 
continued to campaign on the issue through to the federal election later that year.289  The ALP’s 
industrial relations manifesto document, ‘Forward with Fairness’, had been launched during 
April 2007 and had too received a cool reception from trade unionists.  Many felt that its aims 
were too modest and failed to meet the aspirations of the swathes who had opposed 
WorkChoices.  The ALP nevertheless won the election under Kevin Rudd’s leadership.  
Although they had opposed WorkChoices before the election, ALP ministers now said that 
they would retain a federal industrial relations regime and maintain restrictions on unions’ right 
of entry (to workplaces), secret strike ballots and controls on ‘pattern bargaining’.  The 
government did, however, pledge: 
 To phase out AWAs over a period of 5 years; 
 to establish 10 minimum workplace standards in respect of working hours, a right to 
request flexible working patterns, (parental, annual and long-service) leave, notice of 
termination and redundancy pay; 
 to introduce a more comprehensive version of the ‘no-disadvantage test’ for use as a 
benchmark for all future agreements; 
 to re-instate unfair dismissal protection for all employees (although significant 
concessions were proposed for businesses employing fewer than 15 employees); 
 to permit single- or multi-enterprise agreements between employers and employees, 
subject to new obligations to ‘bargain in good faith’, supported by a degree of residual 
arbitration. 
  
First, the Rudd administration enacted the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition 
to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (WRATFF 2008).  This, amongst other measures, 
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prevented the formulation of new AWAs and instead created temporary Individual Transitional 
Employment Agreements (ITEAs) for use during the transition to a new workplace system.290  
ITEAs and collective agreements would both have to pass a revived no-disadvantage test.  
Existing AWAs (which covered an estimated 5-7% of the workforce)291, however, would be 
allowed not only to complete their full term of up to five years, but also to continue indefinitely 
beyond that point unless or until they were terminated or replaced.  Creighton argues that while 
the total number of AWAs may have appeared small, the fact that they existed at all was 
“indicative of an important cultural shift… away from the traditional system, centred on unions, 
awards and the industrial tribunal, towards a more de-collectivised model” and something that 
the Rudd government exploited as it assembled the second, more substantive element of its 
legislative programme, the Fair Work Act 2009 (FWA 2009).292   
 
FWA 2009 abolished the AFPC, the Workplace Authority, the Workplace Ombudsman 
and the AIRC and replaced them with a new statutory body called Fair Work Australia (FWA), 
which became effective on 1 July 2009.  The new workplace system came into effect on 1 
January 2010 and applied to all ‘federal system’ employees.  Under FWA 2009, as under 
WorkChoices, employers, employees and their unions in most of the public sector and in 
unincorporated private sector concerns remain the responsibility of the states unless they 
choose to cede their industrial relations powers (in practice, only Western Australia has refused 
to do so).293  The effect of this is that WorkChoices’ aim that a single national industrial 
relations system should be established has (more or less) been realised under FWA 2009. 
    FWA 2009 has, however, also restored a “safety net” for employees in the form of 10 
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National Employment Standards (NES), covering areas including maximum working hours, 
leave, public holidays, notice of termination, redundancy and flexible working, together with 
additional occupation- or industry-specific conditions through new “Modern Awards” 
designed to simplify and streamline award making across the piece.  While entitlements under 
NESs and Modern Awards are “essentially individualistic in character”, unions have been 
encouraged to become instrumental in the setting of standards and monitoring them to ensure 
that they remain fit for purpose.294  Meanwhile, the legal provisions that regulate trade unions 
are now found in the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009.  Amongst its most 
fundamental requirements are that an applicant association (union) must be “genuine”, free of 
employer control and able to provide evidence that it has a minimum of 50 members. 
 
‘Good faith collective bargaining’ between employers and employees at the enterprise 
level purports to lie at the heart of the new system.  The parties are required to “make a sincere 
effort” in negotiations and refrain from any activity which might undermine the principles that 
underpin freedom of association and collective bargaining.295  Provision is also made for the 
conclusion of ‘greenfields agreements’, but FWA must first be satisfied that any trade union 
that is to be covered by the agreement is entitled to represent a majority of the prospective 
employees to whom it will apply.  If a union can demonstrate that a majority of workers in a 
particular workplace favour collective bargaining, then FWA (if satisfied that it is in the public 
interest to proceed) has the power to issue a ‘Majority Support Determination’ (MSD), 
compelling the employer to engage in collective bargaining with his or her employees and their 
representatives  (it should also be noted that it has now been established that employees and 
their unions can take protected industrial action in an attempt to force an employer to bargain 
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with them without the need first to obtain a MSD296).  Employees can also now appoint a 
bargaining agent to represent them, with a presumption that trade union members will be 
represented by their union unless they specifically nominate another agent.  Where a workplace 
consists of employees who are members of more than one union, then “multiple” unions may 
participate in the negotiations and can become covered by a single agreement.  It should be 
noted that ‘good faith’ does not oblige a bargaining representative either to make concessions 
or to reach an actual agreement.  It is part of FWA’s wide-ranging role to ensure that this 
“philosophical change” is encouraged and embraced by the parties. 
 
The reception for the Rudd government’s FWA 2009 appeared almost to mirror reaction 
in the UK (a decade earlier) to the first Blair government’s introduction of its ERA 1999, where 
initial trade union celebration of a centre-left election victory soon gave way to the realisation 
that the desire of the newly-elected administration was simply to adopt a more “even-handed” 
approach to employment legislation.  Mary Gardiner has argued that WorkChoices regarded 
the relationship between the employer and a collective group of employees as “entirely 
negative”297 and that it had shown itself to be “an old model of work” in which employers acted 
“unilaterally and coercively” and where “managerial prerogative ruled, not as a means to 
greater prosperity, but as an end.”298  It was a flawed (and almost prehistoric) attempt to curtail 
the influence of trade unions that she considers was designed purely to meet the aspirations of 
its sponsors as they sought to re-create the kind of “natural order” that they believed had existed 
during the period when labour laws had been framed around the principles of ‘master and 
servant’.299  She acknowledges that the Rudd government “initially moved quickly” to remove 
what she describes as WorkChoices’ “most coercive and contentious provisions” and 
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recognises that FWA 2009 did prove effective in restoring many of the protections and rights 
that had been taken away by WorkChoices, but is quick to point out that the new government’s 
proposals in no way signified a return to the system that was in place “pre-WorkChoices”.  She 
welcomes the demise of the “enfeebled” AIRC by the more powerful FWA but notes that the 
“corporations power” remained the primary constitutional power under both Rudd’s leadership 
and that of his (ALP) successor, Julia Gillard.  Union rights of entry were restored, but were 
subject to continuing restrictions.  The “footprint of WorkChoices” remained intact within 
FWA 2009300 but it is clear that this did not prevent ALP politicians from successfully “tapping 
in” to voter disillusionment with WorkChoices.  She concludes that neither WRATFF 2008 nor 
the Fair Work Bill 2008 (which later became FWA 2009) were actually “(anywhere) near as 
oppressive or internally incoherent as WorkChoices”, which suggests that the new government 
had rejected at least some of the assumptions on which WorkChoices was based.301 
 
Breen Creighton argues that FWA 2009, while purporting to be “collectivist in nature”, 
does not contemplate collective agreements between employers and unions except in 
circumstances where ‘greenfields agreements’ might apply.302  On the other hand, it treats 
unions as default bargaining representatives for their members, who may elect to become 
covered by an agreement in relation to which a union acted as a bargaining representative.  
Practically (and potentially significantly), he is unaware of any case where an applicant to FWA 
for a MSD has not been a trade union.  He considers that this is “an attenuated form” of 
‘majoritarianism’, but argues that it is not itself a necessary condition of bargaining (most of 
which commences without any suggestion that there should be an MSD).  Creighton believes 
that despite “the rather peculiar way in which the legislation is framed” – and despite its formal 
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emphasis upon “employers and employees” - the process of collective bargaining remains 
“overwhelmingly” driven by trade unions.  
 
Creighton’s (and some others’) observation that the current legislation appears “quite 
well-balanced” and conducive to the maintenance of collective bargaining suggests that the 
introduction of a statutory recognition scheme more in keeping with many trade unionists’ 
aspirations remains unlikely, certainly in the foreseeable future.303  Others may, of course, 
prefer the less complicated finding by Wilkinson et al that the Rudd administration, while 
elected on a manifesto committed to rolling back WorkChoices, introduced a series of 
compromise reforms that did not go as far as many trade unionists had expected but which 
extended further than most employers would have wanted.304  Political ideology and at least 
some reference to manifesto promises by the government of the day will, inevitably, continue 
to be determinant the nature of further reform.  Members of Australia’s current federal 
administration, the Liberal/National Party coalition elected in September 2013, appear content 
not to embark upon further workplace law reform during the current Parliamentary session.  
The Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, has indicated however that any new ‘Lib/Nat’ government 
elected between now and January 2017 will almost certainly propose new legislation that will 
place restrictions on unions’ ability to participate in collective bargaining on behalf of their 
members.  Should this become a reality, then comparisons with WorkChoices and a re-opening 
of the kind of hostilities and campaigning that surrounded its introduction are certain to 
follow.305  
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 Summary 
 
The Australian approach to industrial relations regulation has differed sharply to that 
espoused in Kahn-Freund’s work.  Consistently subjected to more intense, “hands on”, 
regulation by the state, Australia’s federal industrial relations system began with an ‘arbitral’ 
model underpinned by the Constitution and that set minimum standards through a system of 
awards.  This continued pretty much until the 1980s and 1990s when federal ALP 
administrations led by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating embarked on a process designed to move 
away from centralised award-making to more of an ‘enterprise bargaining’ approach.   
 
The subsequent election of successive Liberal/National coalition governments led by 
John Howard ushered in further, controversial reforms that built upon the Hawke/Keating 
legislation but which also installed a regime which was generally and quite comprehensively 
hostile to union participation.  The advent of WorkChoices signified one of the most divisive 
periods in Australian employment law history, Wilkinson has claimed that “the history of 
Australia’s industrial relations system is a history of the rise and fall of Australia’s arbitration 
system” and that it is “the state’s institutional (industrial relations) architecture that has altered 
most dramatically… while the roles of unions, large employers and employer associations have 
undergone “evolutionary but not so startling” change.306   
 
Australia’s history of legal recognition of trade unions and the role of recognition in the 
facilitation of the use of rights of association and practice of collective bargaining contrasts 
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clearly with the UK’s experience.  Employers and unions acknowledged the legitimate role of 
federal and state authorities at an early stage and recognition rights became the foundation for 
association and collective bargaining.  The Australian trade union movement never needed to 
assert a combative and reformist attitude to the law because it actually facilitated union action.  
The cost that Australian unions paid for this lay in the restrictions that were placed on their 
ability to exercise the “freedom of action” enjoyed by their UK counterparts.  If the laissez-
faire model described by Kahn-Freund could be said to represent one end of a spectrum, then 
the narrower freedom of action for unions and employers inherent in the Australian system 
placed it much more on the state supervision and control end (if still far from at its extremity).  
Now, as the UK authorities have moved - probably quite accidentally - towards a regime that 
displays at least some characteristics reminiscent of those traditionally found in Australia’s 
model, Australian politicians appear to have settled on a kind of “consensus” that there should 
be some “relaxation” of their, historically quite regimented, system.  
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE ‘THIRD WAY’, ‘FAIRNESS AT WORK’ AND  
STATUTORY RECOGNITION IN THE UK FROM 1997    
 
 
Introduction 
 
The first three chapters of this study examined Kahn-Freund’s conception of a form of 
‘collective laissez-faire’ that he believed characterised the UK’s industrial relations and 
regulated the bargaining relationship between employers and trade unions, considered the 
development of the series of international treaties, conventions and labour standards that have 
combined to form many of the “norms” that help to define a legitimate role for trade unions in 
the modern free world and summarised how the UK’s trade union law evolved through to the 
latter part of the 20th century.  Chapter Four introduced and analysed the particular ‘model’ of 
union recognition that Australia has adopted as an independent country to demonstrate how 
differently a jurisdiction that remains so “closely-related” to the UK has approached and treated 
the issues that Kahn-Freund identified in his work. 
 
The next step is to consider the context within which Labour governments elected in the 
UK from 1997 sought to stimulate some degree of collective representation and negotiation of 
employee interests, culminating in the establishment of a procedure allowing for ‘statutory 
recognition’ of trade unions in workplaces.  Labour Party policy from Tony Blair’s election as 
its leader in 1994 through to 1999 would be inspired by a combination of some of the “edicts” 
issued by the International Labour Organisation against UK ministers during the 
Conservatives’ 18-year period in office prior to 1997 and ‘Third Way’ thinking as practised by 
past centre-left governments (principally in Australia and the United States) from 1981.  An 
examination of those significant earlier manifestations of the ‘Third Way’ follows this 
introduction. 
 
The main purpose, then, of Chapter Five is to consider the rationale for – and some of 
the key themes within - the 1998 White Paper, ‘Fairness at Work’307 and assess the resulting 
provision for statutory recognition that was introduced in the Employment Rights Act 1999 
(ERA 1999) and revised in the Employment Rights Act 2004 (ERA 2004).  It will include an 
evaluation of the extent to which the architects of the new statutory ‘scheme’ proved able to 
realise their objective of satisfying trade unionists’ demands for enhanced ‘collective rights’ 
within a broader programme of “socially progressive” changes to employment law focused on 
(and designed to appeal to) individual employees.  The finer points of the scheme - including 
the insertion of a ‘Small Business Exclusion’ - will be discussed, as will the role of the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC), the statutory body responsible for adjudicating on applications 
relating to statutory recognition and de-recognition of trade unions. 
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5.1 The Context for Reform and ‘Third Way’ Thinking 
 
The programme of anti-trade union measures implemented by Conservative governments 
during the 1980s and 1990s appeared to have had a particularly damaging effect on recognition 
of trade unions in businesses that were established after 1979.308  Labour ministers elected in 
1997 insisted that they would depart radically from the overtly anti-trade union stance favoured 
by their predecessors and would adopt a far more “even-handed” approach to industrial 
relations.309  They resolved to construct a new labour relations framework that would not only 
accommodate the TUC’s clamour for a significant enhancement of “collective rights” and 
address the ILO’s persistent criticisms of UK’s breaches of its Conventions310 but would also 
avoid industrial unrest and continue to encourage business investment.  The new government 
explicitly stated that it would not repeal the raft of trade union legislation introduced by the 
Conservatives from 1979 and maintained that its overriding commitment would be to establish 
“basic minimum rights for the individual at the workplace, where our aim is partnership not 
conflict between employers and employees”311. 
 
The ILO had issued numerous reprimands to Conservative ministers in respect of the 
UK’s failure to fulfil its obligations under Conventions 87 and 98 throughout their 18 years in 
office, but the agency’s inability to attach effective sanctions to its criticisms meant that most 
of the recommendations made by its Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and its Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) were simply 
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ignored.312  Unsurprisingly then, the ILO Conference Committee welcomed the Labour 
government’s prompt reinstatement of the right of workers at the Government Communication 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham to join a trade union313 that the Thatcher government 
had removed in 1984 and which had been found by the CFA to contravene Article 2 of 
Convention 87.314  Wider trade union membership had, however, substantially declined during 
from 1979 to 1997 and the employer lobby generally felt that it retained the upper hand in 
workplace bargaining.315  The Labour Party leadership’s response to this changed social and 
political landscape was to commission a series of reviews of economic and employment 
policies.  It publicly embraced the ideology of the ‘Third Way’316 and promised that the new 
government would devise a programme of legislation that could be applied successfully to the 
“British political economy.” 
 
Howell believes that the term ‘Third Way’ represents a shorthand for the approach taken 
by a number of modern-day centre–left governments both when critiquing what they believe 
to be the essential tenets of post-Second World War social democracy (namely, the objective 
of full employment, the existence of an extensive and universal welfare state, a leading role for 
the public sector in the management of the economy and a ‘corporatist’ relationship with 
organised labour)  and in their attempts to formulate what they consider to be more sustainable 
forms of those “structures” within the constraints of ‘international’ capitalism.317  Proponents 
of Third Way theory have tended to argue that a more even distribution of skills and production 
capacity offers a much better prospect of bringing into effect a more egalitarian society than 
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say, simple “income redistribution”.  They have emphasised the need for “responsible 
budgeting”, recommended that increased equal opportunities should be intertwined with 
increased personal responsibility, stressed the importance of increased co-operation between 
the public and private sectors and argued for the introduction of measures to improve the supply 
of labour as well as increased investment in human development, public infrastructure and 
protection of the environment.  Third Way supporters argue that it rejects “traditional neo-
liberalism” as much as it does ‘top-down socialism’ (unlike neo-liberalists, they reason that the 
state has a central role to play in realising many or all of their aims).  Its  opponents often claim, 
however, that its real purpose is to attempt to construct an unlikely (some might argue a 
“bogus”) ‘coalition’ between the competing priorities of capital and labour and involving offers 
by government of certain “guarantees” to business groups regarding the safeguarding of their 
own parochial interests as well as wider economic prosperity while simultaneously making 
pledges to citizens that it will pursue policies designed to increase personal living standards 
and counter injustice.318   
        
Arguably the most problematic aspect of Third Way thinking is the apparent ease with 
which it may appear to ignore societal power relations.  The traditional ‘laissez-faire’ industrial 
relations system afforded the parties within these relationships space to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements.  Unionised workers protected their own working conditions through 
their collective associations.  The Third Way assumed that a right was granted by law.  A union-
negotiated right was effectively “reduced” to one of mere equivalence with the overall effect 
that enshrinement in law of individual worker’s rights “supplanted” the collective negotiation 
process.  This, however, ignores issues of enforcement in workplaces.  Third Way advocacy 
assumes that compliance can be obtained through legal structures and that substitution of the 
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state as the provider of rights in the workplace will not undermine workers’ own organisations 
as providers of rights at work.  Thus, it can be argued that it operates “blind” to the effects of 
power in each direction – namely, the power of the employer in the workplace and the nature 
of the powerbase of the trade unions as negotiators and defenders of workplace rights.  This, 
in turn, raises the question of whether the recognition provisions have similar unarticulated 
impacts upon the legitimacy and efficacy of workplace associations.  Champions of the Third 
Way tend to argue that it has somehow been “non-ideological” in its conception.  Scepticism 
has, however also increased – including from those who may previously have been sympathetic 
to the theory in its conception - that the effects of globalisation and (more recently) the 
pursuance of post-‘Crash’ austerity policies in the UK and other Western economies have 
cemented inequality across society (including in employment relations) that the Third Way 
fails to address satisfactorily.319 
 
The Blair government claimed to draw much of its inspiration from arguably the earliest 
exponents of “a variant” of Third Way social democracy, the Hawke and Keating (ALP) 
governments that held office in Australia from 1983 to 1996.320  Those governments had 
legislated to expand the ‘social wage’ of benefits (ranging from the introduction of compulsory 
employer contributions to private pensions to increased funding for childcare) while 
encouraging, to the disapproval of many in the union movement, a policy of wage restraint.321  
Australian federal government had worked to integrate employer actions in “structural 
arrangements to oversee the rollout of macro- and micro-economic changes” and while the 
wider business community might not have considered itself a fully-fledged “partner” in the 
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government’s agenda, larger employer associations undoubtedly wielded significant influence 
over those administrations during their early years.322  
 
Crouch suggests that the UK Labour Party persevered with the neoliberal approach 
favoured by their Conservative predecessors, albeit with some concessions to the trade unions 
and “social-democratic preferences”.  He disputes the notion that industrial policies can be 
labelled as ‘Third Way’ simply because they either occupy a mid-point between post-War 
social democracy and neoliberalism (or combine elements of both) and argues that they should 
encompass measures designed specifically to encourage and stimulate industrial relations, 
quite distinct from prior forms of class relations regulation.323  Smith and Morton agree that 
the UK politicians’ understanding of the Third Way led them simply to settle on an 
“accommodation with neoliberalism and (a) modified acceptance of the Thatcherite 
landscape”.324  Howell maintains that it is a mistake to believe that the theory must always be 
viewed as “a coherent… model of industrial relations”.  He argues that the situation is 
necessarily more complex, not least because many governmental initiatives tend to be borne 
out of more short term “political” calculation.  He concludes that the “logic” of the Labour 
government’s Third Way industrial relations regulation reform should be regarded as more 
significant than the motives of those who initiated it.325  
 
 
5.1.1 The Wilson and Palmer Cases 
 
                                                          
322 Wilkinson, Bailey and Mourell (n327). 
323 Colin Crouch, ‘A Third Way in industrial relations?’ in Stuart White (ed), New Labour: The Progressive 
Future? (Palgrave MacMillan 2001) 104.  
324 John McIlroy, ‘The Enduring Alliance? Trade Unions and the Making of New Labour, 1994- 1997’ (1998) 
36(4) BJIR 537, 558.  
325 Howell (n324) 3.  
Jeff Shaw QC (the former Attorney-General of New South Wales)326 and others have 
indicated that another “sub-text” to FAW was the desire to rectify the “unjust” verdicts reached 
in two separate cases, Associated Newspapers Limited v Wilson327 and Associated British Ports 
v Palmer328, which would later be “combined” and referred to simply as Wilson and Palmer.329   
 
Wilson and Palmer began in 1989 when an employee received written notification from 
his employer (the owners of the Daily Mail newspaper) that it had decided not to renew its 
recognition agreement with his trade union, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ).  The letter 
also stated that the company would pay a 4.5% wage increase, backdated for three months, to 
any employee who opted to sign a new personal contract with the company prior to the expiry 
of the recognition agreement.  Wilson, then a NUJ lay official, refused to sign the new contract 
and did not receive the wage increase.  He complained to an industrial tribunal, which held that 
the employer had breached section 23 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
(EPCA 1978).  This provided that every employee had the right not to be subjected to action 
short of dismissal for the purpose of preventing or deterring membership of an independent 
trade union or to be penalised for doing so.330   
 
The industrial tribunal’s decision was first overturned by the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) but then reinstated by the Court of Appeal331 where Dillon LJ specifically 
refused to accept the employer’s argument that any distinction could be drawn between 
membership of a trade union membership and participation in the collective bargaining 
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undertaken by that union.332  The case also restored an industrial tribunal decision in favour of 
members of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT), including 
Palmer, who had similarly been denied pay increases by their employers after they had rejected 
financial inducements in return for surrender of their collective bargaining rights.  Conservative 
ministers believed that the decision undermined their policy of encouraging employers to offer 
individual contracts and they moved quickly to introduce what became known as “the 
Ullswater amendment”333 to the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill 1993.  This 
specified that where an employer wished to “further a change in his relationship with all or any 
class of his employees”, any complaint (against him or her) of action short of dismissal would 
be excluded unless “the action was such as no reasonable employer would take”.  The 
amendment sought to neutralise the effect of the Court of Appeal’s judgement by redefining 
what could constitute discrimination against members of trade union members but was 
ultimately rendered unnecessary when, following an appeal by the respective employers in the 
two cases, the House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling and restored the 
decisions of the EAT.  The majority of their Lordships ruled that refusal to award a pay increase 
to employees who had chosen to retain their collectively bargained terms and conditions merely 
constituted an omission, that such conduct did not fall within the definition of “action short of 
dismissal” and that there had therefore been no breach of EPCA 1978, s23 in either case.   
 
The extent to which collective bargaining constitutes a central feature of union 
membership forms the subject of continuing debate.  The Law Lords unanimously held in 
                                                          
332 The industrial dispute between British Airways and the ‘Unite’ trade union, representing striking cabin crew, 
provided the opportunity for the re-opening of a discussion of the issues that had been considered by the Court 
of Appeal when the airline’s Chief Executive, Willie Walsh, announced that he would permanently strip those 
staff who took part in strikes of their travel perks.  Although the company maintained that the perks were “non-
contractual” and could be withdrawn at any time, Unite declared that the company’s move was “vindictive” and 
vowed to challenge it.  See BBC News, ‘BA strikers to forfeit cheap travel perks’ (BBC News, 24 March 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8584720.stm> accessed 24 March 2010 
333 This became TULRCA 1992 s148(3). 
Wilson and Palmer that collective bargaining was not a crucial element of union membership 
and emphasised that unions unable to so negotiate on behalf of groups of members could 
nevertheless offer them a range of other worthwhile services.  Novitz and Skidmore believe 
that the decision in Wilson and Palmer reflected a lack of ‘public policy’ support for trade 
unionism and that their Lordships’ “individualised view of trade unionism” (in which unions 
could find themselves excluded from collective bargaining and certain employer actions could 
be designated as “omissions”) threatened to undermine potential future claims of 
discrimination due to membership of a union.  Not only did an employer have to take “positive 
steps” against an employee before such protection could be activated, but he or she could also 
selectively offer inducements to any employees who were willing to assist in the dismantling 
of arrangements for collective bargaining.334  These “defects” placed the UK in breach of 
Article 1 of ILO Convention 98, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of membership of 
trade unions.335  The first Blair government partially addressed the issue in ERA 1999, which 
replaced the words “action short of dismissal” with “subjecting an individual to a detriment” 
where this included a deliberate failure to act.336  As has already been discussed in Chapter 
Two of this dissertation337, the ECtHR subsequently ruled in Demir and Baykara v Turkey338 
that the ability to participate in collective bargaining formed an essential element within 
individuals’ exercise of their rights under Article 11 of the ECHR.  
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5.2 ‘FAW’ and ERA 1999 
 
A persistent claim made by members of the Thatcher and Major governments from 1979 
was that the Wilson and Callaghan governments had allowed unions to become too powerful 
and that this had culminated in the series of mainly public sector strikes during late 1978 and 
early 1979 known as the “Winter of Discontent.”339  Conservative politicians now argued that 
FAW signalled “a journey back to strife.”340  The government, however, re-iterated its intention 
not to embark on wholesale repeal of existing legislation.  Simultaneously, there appeared to 
be a significant ‘bias’ in the number of “business people” who were being recruited into 
government positions compared to those who possessed a union background.  Union leaders 
who had previously enjoyed more “direct access” to Labour policy-making became 
increasingly reliant on more informal contact and the maintenance of constructive relations 
with individual (often junior) ministers to retain some influence.341  Notwithstanding these 
developments, expectations persisted amongst trade unions and employer associations that 
forthcoming legislation would reflect “Labour’s longstanding intention to establish a statutory 
mechanism for gaining union recognition where majority support existed amongst the 
workforce.”342 
 
The government resolved that it would “steer a way between the absence of minimum 
standards of protection at the workplace, and a return to the laws of the past.”  It acknowledged 
the imbalance in bargaining power between employers and individual employees that favoured 
the former and proposed a “dual-pronged” approach to employment relations.  This included 
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an enhancement of some individual employment rights (such as the reduction of the qualifying 
period for unfair dismissal claims from two years’ service to one) that each employee could 
then exercise either on his or her own or with others343 and increased opportunities for unions 
to bargain collectively.  There would be more emphasis on collective representation in 
workplaces to help ensure that workers were treated fairly and it was proposed that individuals 
should have a legal right to be accompanied by a work colleague or union representative during 
grievance and disciplinary proceedings even if that union was not recognised by the employer 
for the purpose of collective bargaining.344   
 
FAW addressed the issues surrounding the proposed implementation of a statutory 
recognition scheme through reference to three objectives that ministers had determined would 
need to be satisfied by any new regulatory system.  The first stated that there was a need “to 
provide for representation and recognition where a majority of the relevant workforce wants 
it”.345  The second (which they indicated would be necessary in order to give effect to the first) 
specified that only a procedure that could prove practicable would suffice.346  The third - and 
as this chapter will also emphasise, almost certainly the most significant – of the aims was that 
the parties should be encouraged to reach voluntary agreements wherever possible.347 
 
FAW’s Foreword repeated that there would be no wholesale repeal of the post-1979 
programme of trade union legislation and that strikes without ballots, mass picketing, the closed 
shop and secondary action would all continue to be outlawed.  “Employability” and 
“flexibility” were identified as the principal determinants of efficiency and fairness in the 
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labour market and were to be supported by “a labour market culture and legislative framework 
that would (together) promote economic growth, enhance competitiveness, encourage 
entrepreneurship and foster job creation.”348  This would prove to be a stiff challenge to a 
government intent on balancing the competing demands of the unions and a sceptical business 
lobby and ministers strove to appeal to the latter by claiming that the UK would retain “the 
most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world.”349  The government 
envisaged the abandonment of any notion of conflicting employer and employee interest in 
favour of a heightened sense of “partnership” in workplaces350 that would result in more 
effective communication between the parties and improved overall business performance.351  
Oxenbridge et al identify this “promotion of partnership” as FAW’s central theme.352 
 
Ministers also pronounced that any calls to reinstate Schedule 11 of EPA 1975 (which 
sought to sustain collective bargaining) would be resisted.353  Novitz and Skidmore argue that 
this rendered the “partnership” so revered in FAW little more than a mask for a wholly 
“alternative vision” of the trade union function.  Unions were expected to subordinate 
themselves within a “primary relationship” that ministers believed should exist between the 
employer and the individual worker even if this compromised their ability to defend their 
members’ collective interests.  Lay representatives and paid officials alike faced the prospect 
of being relegated to a role as “tools” that managers – or, for that matter, individual workers - 
might call upon occasionally to assist in mediation or act as “conduits for information and 
consultation” with the consequence that they might lose their workplace presence unless they 
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could demonstrate that they added “value” to the enterprise.354  ERA 1999 finally came into 
force in the UK on 6 June 2000 and included measures that would enable a trade union seeking 
to be recognised by an employer for the purpose of representing a bargaining unit of employees 
to submit an application for recognition and outlined the various hurdles that successful 
applicant unions would be required to overcome. 
 
 
5.2.1 Trade Union Recognition through the Schedule A1 Procedure 
 
The purpose of ERA 1999 and ERA 2004 appears to have been to establish a recognition 
system (Schedule A1) based on a ‘Wagner (North American)-like’ form of “statutory union 
certification within which unions and employers are forced to compete for workers’ votes 
resulting in an allocation of “brokering” rights based upon specified threshold levels of worker 
support in bargaining units that amount to a ‘majority’ in support.355  FAW reasoned that the 
impact of collective bargaining on all employees (including those who choose not make a claim 
for union representation) can be such that recognition (including statutory recognition) should 
only be granted in circumstances where demonstrable, “substantial” support for it exists.356  
While the government may have favoured relatively “limited” forms of consultation prior to 
the introduction of most of its “other” legislation, it decided that a different approach needed 
to be adopted in respect of its employment and trade union law reforms.  Ministers sought to 
“de-politicise” their proposed changes in the law through the use of continuing dialogue that 
involved employers’ groups357 as well as the TUC.  Periodic “concessions” were offered to 
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Formal arrangements for the statutory recognition scheme were finally set out in ERA 
1999, Section 1359 and Schedule 1.  They amended TULRCA 1992 through the insertion of a 
new Section 70A and a Schedule A1 that set out the new procedure in detail.  Schedule A1 
explicitly stated that employers and trade unions should be encouraged, wherever possible, to 
reach voluntary agreements occasioning the recognition of the latter by the former in 
workplaces for the purpose of representing employees’ interests.  Recourse to “forced” 
statutory recognition would be available to the union (or unions) concerned in circumstances 
where all efforts to reach a voluntary agreement had proved unsuccessful.  Schedule A1 was 
distinguishable from earlier, ostensibly “comparable” legislation (including IRA 1971) because 
its function was not so much to actively promote recognition as emphasise the importance of 
“choice” in industrial relations.  Thus, the procedure could only be activated where a majority 
of workers indicated their desire that a union (or unions) should be recognised.360  A, further 
restriction was then added in the form of the ‘Small Business Exclusion’.  This determined that 
the statutory scheme would not have any application in enterprises comprising fewer than 21 
employees361, the effects of which have proved to be highly significant.   
 
 
5.2.2 The Union’s Request, Bargaining Units and the Employer’s Response 
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 Trade unions choosing to invoke the statutory procedure were required to submit a formal 
request for recognition to the employer.362  Valid requests had to be written and include an 
explicit statement that recognition was being sought under Schedule A1 of TULRCA 1992.  
The applicant union (or unions) had to be identified and appropriate certificates of verification 
included in the submission.363  The parameters of the proposed ‘bargaining unit’ had to be made 
clear and remain the same in any subsequent application that might be made to the CAC364 (all 
subject to the requirement that the employer employed at least 21 employees on the date of 
receipt of the union’s request or that an average of at least 21 workers had been so employed 
during the 13 week period ending on that day365) and the request had to be received by the 
employer.366  If the parties agreed both the constitution of a bargaining unit and that the 
applicant should be recognised to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of the workers 
“contained” within it, then the statutory recognition procedure would come to an end.367  If, 
however, the employer chose to reject the request or failed to respond to it within a period of 
10 days, the union had the option of referring the case to the CAC. 
 
Valid applications to the CAC also needed to be in writing and again, the employer from 
whom recognition was sought had either to have at least 21 ‘workers’ in his or her employment 
on the day of the request or have employed the same number, on average, during the course of 
the previous 13 weeks (this did not mean that there had to be at least 21 workers within the 
proposed bargaining unit).  Criteria for acceptance of applications under the Schedule A1 
procedure appeared stricter than those contained in the earlier ‘EPA 1975 scheme’.  An 
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application could only succeed in circumstances where a minimum of 10% of employees were 
union members, there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering some or all of 
the workers in the proposed bargaining unit and if the CAC was satisfied that a majority of the 
workers in the bargaining unit would be likely to support recognition.   
Following acceptance of the application, the employer and union then had 20 days to 
agree the details of the bargaining unit.  If they could not reach an agreement, then the CAC 
would intervene to determine appropriate parameters.  The CAC’s principal concern – 
consistent with the central theme of FAW - was that the bargaining unit should be “compatible” 
with effective management of the employer’s business but other factors including the views of 
the employer and the union, any existing national and local bargaining arrangements, the 
advantages inherent in avoiding small or fragmented bargaining units and the characteristics 
and location of the workforce could also be taken into account.  If the union could demonstrate 
that a majority of workers in the defined ‘bargaining unit’ were union members, then the CAC 
could grant recognition without the need for a ballot.368  The CAC would, however, order a 
ballot if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit were not union members and it had 
discretion to do so if: 
a) it was satisfied that the ballot should be held in the interests of good relations; 
b) it had evidence, which it considered to be credible, from a significant number of union 
members within the bargaining unit that they did not want the union (or unions) to 
conduct collective bargaining on their behalf; 
c) evidence was presented to it that led it to doubt that a significant number of union 
members within the bargaining unit wanted the union (or unions) to bargain on their 
behalf. 
 
Where an employer indicated a willingness to negotiate, the parties then had a further 20 
days to reach a settlement with scope for further extension by agreement.369  If the negotiations 
failed, the union could then apply to the CAC370 unless the union had rejected an earlier request 
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from the employer to solicit the assistance of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service during the negotiations.371  Where a ballot was held, the applicant union could 
campaign for a ‘yes’ vote amongst employees372 and the employer was obliged to co-operate 
in the process.373  A majority of votes in favour and the support of at least 40 per cent of the 
workers in the bargaining unit were needed to secure recognition and “victor” unions were then 
expected to reach agreements with employers regarding the means through which they would 
conduct collective bargaining.374  If agreement could not be reached, then the CAC could 
intervene375 and impose a legally enforceable bargaining procedure on the parties confined to 
pay, working hours and holidays376 (compliance with which was enforceable through an order 
of specific performance377).  It could also order variations to collective bargaining 
arrangements where either of the parties could demonstrate that the original bargaining unit 
was no longer appropriate due to some alteration in the organisation or business activities of 
the enterprise or following a substantial change to the number of workers who formed the 
original bargaining unit.378  
 
 
5.2.3 Provision for De-Recognition 
 
ERA 1999 enabled employers to “de-recognise” unions that had secured recognition via 
Schedule A1, but only once a period of at least three years had elapsed following the CAC’s 
earlier declaration of recognition.379  De-recognition could also be authorised by the CAC if 
                                                          
371 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 12(5). 
372 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 26(3). 
373 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 26. 
374 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 30(2). 
375 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, paras 30(3), 31(2) . 
376 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 31(3). 
377 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 1, para 31(6). 
378 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 3, para 66 
379 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 4, paras 96-97. 
the number of workers employed in the enterprise fell below 21380 or where the majority of the 
bargaining unit supported de-recognition in an employer- or employee-initiated ballot.381  
 
 
5.3 The New Legislation in Practice 
 
If ministers’ primary objective was that their “unbiased approach” to recognition382 might 
help to institute a fresh culture of co-operation within industrial relations, then the early 
indications were positive.  They had calculated that the mere suggestion that an applicant union 
seeking recognition might invoke the statutory scheme would prompt many employers to seek 
negotiation of voluntary agreements to avoid the alternative of state-imposed recognition 
appeared well-founded as several actually concluded voluntary agreements383 with by now re-
enthused unions384 in the period leading up to ERA 1999 becoming effective.   
 
The government had stipulated that the legislation should include scope for the employers 
and unions to conclude voluntary outcomes wherever possible385 and closer examination of 
Schedule A1 had revealed that either party could, at any stage, obviate the need for a CAC 
determination simply by choosing to enter into negotiations with the other.386  This suggests 
that active promotion of recognition had never actually been the government’s objective at all 
and that ministers’ keenness not to be seen to be “taking sides” had seen them prioritise the 
maintenance of “choice” in industrial relations above all other considerations.   
                                                          
380 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 4, para 99. 
381 TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1: Part 4, para 117. 
382 Dukes (n8) 251. 
383 Sarah Oxenbridge and others, ‘Initial Responses to the Statutory Recognition Provisions of the Employment 
Relations Act 1999’ (2003) 41(2) BJIR 315, 316. 
384 Gall (n350) 254. 
385 Michael Wills, Hansard (HC) Standing Committee E, 16 March 1999, c. 348. 
386 ibid. 
 FAW’s proponents resolved that they would strive to avoid a repeat of the blighted 
attempts to expand recognition that had been made through EPA 1975, the pertinent provisions 
of which were repealed by the Conservatives in 1980 following a string of intractable 
operational difficulties.  Within that earlier “scheme”, ACAS’s tripartite Council (which had 
been handed responsibility for the handling of recognition claims) had proved unable to agree 
clear criteria in respect of specific measures such as the level of employee support that should 
be required in order to succeed in any recognition claim and the suitability of the claimed 
bargaining unit.  “Inter-union competition” had often given rise to protracted litigation 
involving both rival unions and some employers, many of whom chose also to seek to obstruct 
the process through means of time-wasting and other forms of non-cooperation.  There were 
frequent delays in the processing of recognition claims, while the enforcement procedure 
contained in the Act (which provided for unilateral recourse to arbitration in respect of a union 
claim for improved terms and conditions) offered little in the way of any incentive to hostile 
employers to bargain once it had been recommended that recognition should be granted.387  
Schedule A1 strove therefore to define employers’ responsibilities before and during employee 
ballots much more strictly.  They also undertook to restrict the scope for judicial review of 
CAC decisions that had arisen from the discretion conferred by EPA 1975 on ACAS to 
adjudicate on recognition matters.  Efforts were made to anticipate all conceivable 
contingencies and render more prescriptive the action to be taken in the event of non-
compliance.388  The inevitable outcome was a procedure that was lengthier and more complex 
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in form than its predecessors.389   
 
The effects of “voluntarism” aside, the introduction of a statutory procedure created a 
mechanism through which unions could “forcibly” achieve their aim.  The essential pre-
requisite for a successful application is, of course, that a majority of workers in the bargaining 
unit should support recognition.  The CAC determined, through a series of decisions, that such 
a level of support can be established by reference to majority membership decisions, a straw 
poll and signed statements by employees that express their support for collective bargaining.390  
From the outset, the CAC reserved the right to maintain a flexible approach when adjudicating 
on whether such measures as a “given level” of current membership could be said to signify 
support for collective bargaining.  In GMB and Trafford Park Bakery391, the CAC rejected the 
application because while the level of membership was shown to be 67% and 10 out of a 
bargaining unit of 15 were union members, 7 employees had written opposing recognition for 
the purpose of collective bargaining.  That said, the CAC also showed itself willing to make 
some allowance to unions in respect of the practical problems that they faced when seeking to 
gain access to the workforce to gather information relevant to an application.  In AEEU and 
GE Caledonian Ltd392, it decided that employees’ expression of 43.8% support for recognition 
had been affected by unfair practises that the employer had carried out to “extreme lengths”.   
 
While the CAC is prepared to consider “contrary evidence” submitted by employers, it 
has determined that counter-petitions that some employers have sought to organise may not be 
considered so compelling as their trade union equivalents.  For example, in Unite the Union v 
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Stephens and George Ltd393, the panel refused to deduct all of those signatories from the 
union’s petition who had also signed the employer’s document.  GMB v Capital Aluminium 
Extrusions Limited394 is an example of an instance in which the CAC has decided that contrary 
evidence can be persuasive.  In that case, union membership levels in the proposed bargaining 
unit stood at 46.15%.  The union omitted to produce a petition demonstrating that it had 
additional support, while the employer conducted a snap survey that showed that 61.54% of 
the workforce did not support recognition.  Panel members were persuaded by the latter 
because while the employer’s covering letter issued to all workers explaining the purpose of 
the survey set out its opposition to recognition, it also stated that there was no obligation on 
employees to provide a reply and that they remained free to express their personal opinions if 
they did choose to respond.  They were also afforded the opportunity to reply anonymously 
and place the replies in sealed envelopes that could then be handed to a specified employee 
who was a union member.  The envelopes were later opened in the presence both of that 
individual and the company’s managing director. 
 
The CAC also considered how the provisions contained in Schedule A1 should apply in 
the case of employers who operated in more than one site or location.  In R (Kwik-Fit) v. 
CAC395, the CAC accepted the union’s proposal that the bargaining unit should be constituted 
from all of the employer’s locations found within the M25 motorway.  The employer argued 
in the High Court that the unit should be extended to include all of the company’s sites beyond 
the M25 on the ground that this was the most appropriate bargaining unit.  The High Court 
ruled in the employer’s favour but was overruled by the Court of Appeal which reinstated the 
CAC’s decision.  Conversely, in TGWU and Economic Skips Ltd396, the CAC was persuaded 
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that a ballot should be ordered following expression by the employer of “the sincerely held 
view… that the majority of the workers in the bargaining unit did not want recognition”.  Thus, 
it can be seen that the interpretative problems posed by the Schedule have deliberately been 
disposed of by the courts to a government body charged with specific responsibility for 
regulation of UK law as it applies to trade union recognition and collective bargaining matters. 
 
Gall’s 2003 analysis of trends in recognition dates from 1995 (the point at which he 
suggests it became virtually certain that there would be a Labour victory at the 1997 general 
election and an acceptance by observers that such an administration would legislate to establish 
a statutory recognition procedure397).  He reported a significant increase in the number of 
agreements concluded and workers covered during that eight-year period and a commensurate 
reduction in the number of employees who found themselves the subject of “de-recognition” 
by employers.398  He cautioned though that the phenomenon could not simply be put down to 
unions’ exercise of formal recourse to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) alone and that 
there were other, more reliable explanations for the growth in the number of new agreements.  
These included unions’ “organising activities”, the ‘shadow effect of ERA 1999, “responses 
by employers” and a ‘new’ climate in industrial relations.  Trade union organising in particular, 
including exploitation of Labour’s union recognition policy at every stage (from its initial 
formation while in opposition through to its formal enactment once elected into government) 
was felt to be crucial in stimulating recognition campaigns and placing pressure on employers 
who might otherwise have been minded not to reach agreements.  This instilled the unions with 
sufficient confidence to persist with their approach, enabling them to broaden their organising 
activities and becoming more ambitious in terms of their recognition and recruitment 
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objectives.399   
 
Gall also reported that “imminence” of the incoming legislation’s arrival had been 
overtaken by “the effect of presence and usage”.  “Presence” referred to the availability of 
recourse to the new statutory procedure now enjoyed by unions as well as the cumulative and 
positive ‘bandwagon’ impact of the increased quantity of new agreements that were then being 
finalised, while “usage” described the threatened, partial (that is, where an application was 
submitted and then progressed in order that a voluntary agreement might be elicited) or full 
(actual) use of the statutory procedure.  Gall indicated that by the end of 2002, both partial and 
full usage could be said to have yielded a “positive demonstration effect” with an 
overwhelming majority of applications to the CAC having been accepted.  Only a small 
minority were rejected and approximately a third of those that were withdrawn by applicant 
unions prior to their acceptance (by the CAC) were eventually re-submitted.  A clear majority 
of the CAC’s bargaining unit determinations favoured trade unions and this alone may have 
contributed significantly to the trend of increasing quantities of voluntary agreements that were 
concluded following applications.400   
 
The TUC’s annual ‘Trade Union Trends: Focus on Recognition’ report published in 
February 2003 broadly supported Gall’s findings but offered a significantly more pessimistic 
assessment of recognition campaigners’ future prospects.401  The rate of increase in the number 
of agreements secured by unions had slowed amidst concerns that most agreements that it had 
been expected might be struck with more receptive employers would have been concluded with 
more obstructive employers’ workforces having been left largely “unprotected”.  Workplace 
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campaigning had shifted increasingly towards the smaller enterprise sector simply because 
more agreements had been concluded in large workplaces (including those who had previously 
opposed recognition) but they had proved even more adept at resistance.  The TUC conceded 
that the number of additional workers who had become covered by a recognised trade union 
that year totalled almost three times the figure reported in their similar survey just three years 
earlier, but reaffirmed its concern regarding what it saw as the scope for exploitation by 
employers of loopholes within ERA 1999 aimed at thwarting recognition.402  It had, in fact, 
already (if not altogether successfully) submitted many of these concerns to the government-
sponsored review of ERA 1999 that ministers had instigated in July 2002.403  Broad-based and 
involving consultation with both employers and unions, it reported in February 2003 and paved 
the way for the introduction of a second Act, ERA 2004, in September 2004.404 
 
 
5.3.1 The Effect of the ‘Small Business Exclusion’ 
 
Keith Ewing and Anne Hock were asked by the TUC and a number of its affiliated unions 
to consider the implications of ERA 1999’s recognition provisions for smaller firms.  Having 
recognised that neither IRA 1971 nor EPA 1975 introduced any exclusion in respect of small 
businesses, they examined the consequences of the exclusion of firms employing fewer than 
21 workers from the statutory recognition (Schedule A1) scheme and reported their findings in 
2003.405  Their eventual conclusions were founded on the premise that recognition should be 
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seen as a “precondition of collective bargaining” and that any resulting right to bargain 
collectively is recognised as a human right in various international human rights treaties that 
bind0 the UK.406  The ILO provisions regarding collective bargaining are located in Article 4 
of its Convention 98 (Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively), which states that:  
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage 
and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation 
between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to 
the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements. 
 
Ewing and Hock recognised the settled view of the ILO’s Committee of Experts that few, if 
any, exceptions to the rights set out in Convention 98 were permissible (those that did pertained 
more to particular groups of workers such as the military and police) and noted the absence in 
the ILO’s jurisprudence of any suggestion that a state might exclude small employers from its 
obligation to deliver collective bargaining under Article 4.407  Far from accepting the small 
business exemption from the statutory scheme, the Committee of Experts identified the upsurge 
in the number of small enterprises (with all the associated fragmentation in labour markets and 
consequences for employment patterns) as compelling evidence that states should increase the 
scope for collective bargaining within their jurisdictions.  There was particular anxiety that the 
emergence of this “new economy” raised particular concerns for advocates of collective 
bargaining.  It had been demonstrated that there was little or no tradition of bargaining practice 
in many small enterprises, while the growth of outsourcing (as practiced by increasing numbers 
of larger concerns) had radically altered the nature of many employment relationships.408   
 
Ewing and Hock discovered that the most striking effect of the small business exclusion 
had been to deny more than a fifth of the labour force the right to trade union recognition and 
representation unless their employer agreed.  They found that 24,695, 000 employees had been 
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employed by 1.2 million employers and that of the former, 1.6 million had been employed in 
concerns containing between 10 and 19 employees, 1.5 million had been employed in concerns 
containing between 5 and 9 employees and 2.3 million had been employed in concerns 
containing between 1 and 4 employees.  Overall, 21.8% of workers had been employed in 
businesses containing fewer than 20 employees.409  The impact of the exclusion was not the 
same in every sector of the economy and specific industries, including clothing and printing, 
were said to be characterised by an especially high number of small businesses while other 
industries contained a much lower than average number.  They also noted some specific effects 
in manufacturing.410  Ewing and Hock concluded that the provisions contained within the 
Schedule A1 Procedure effectively denied more than 5.5 million people the right to trade union 
representation on the same terms as workers employed in concerns containing 21 or more 
employees and that these same people were also being denied rights that were conditional upon 
their trade union being recognised.411  There was also a concern that consequences arising from 
the small business exclusion could prove to be particularly detrimental to women, due both to 
the correlation between an absence of collective bargaining and pay inequality and because 
more women than men were likely to be employed in small businesses (and were therefore 
exposed greater risk of being denied the right to be a member of a recognised union).412  The 
exclusion of small firms from the statutory recognition scheme continues to be a running sore 
for the TUC.413  
 
 
                                                          
409 ibid 12. 
410 ibid. 
411 ibid 15. 
412 ibid 17-18.  44.5% of men were shown to work in workplaces containing fewer than 50 employees, 
compared to 52% of women.  
413 Trades Union Congress, The Employment Relations Act 2004 - A TUC Guide (Trades Union Congress 2005) 
7. 
5.4 The ILO and TUC Responses to the Introduction of Schedule A1 
 
The Schedule A1 scheme attracted the wrath of the ILO's Committee of Experts.  It 
considered submissions from the UK government, the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions and the TUC and found that the procedure contravened its Convention 98 (the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining) in five respects.414  Their concerns focused on 
the rules regarding prohibition of acts of anti-union discrimination and interference by 
employers and ‘unfair practices’ perpetuated either by a union or an employer, the stipulation 
that successful applicants would need to have recruited a majority of the workers in the 
bargaining unit into membership or secure a majority vote in a ballot where at least 40% of 
workers had voted415, the exclusion of applications in respect of employers who employed 
fewer than 21 workers (the Committee referred specifically to the TUC's submission that the 
effect of this constraint would be to deny the employees of small businesses the right to 
participate in a union) and, the disqualification of applications in circumstances where 
recognition agreements were already in existence.416   
 
While Labour ministers may not actively have encouraged trade unions to expect the 
restoration of all of the freedoms that they had once enjoyed, pragmatists within the union 
movement believed that the FAW proposals represented at least some kind of opportunity to 
“re-legitimise” trade unionism and re-shape the environment within which employer-employee 
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relations might be conducted.417  The introduction of the new statutory procedure did indeed 
lead to a marked increase in the number of voluntary agreements, certainly in the short term, 
as a number of employers opted to negotiate outcomes with union representatives to avoid 
“state-imposed recognition”.  The TUC remained critical though of agreements that it said had 
been concluded with unions who were not “truly independent” and what it felt was the 
ineffective mechanism through which such “unions” could (theoretically) be de-recognised.  It 
also continued to voice fierce opposition to the inclusion within the scheme of high-profile, 
“hostile” measures such as the 40% ‘Yes’ vote requirement and the Small Business Exclusion 
for firms employing fewer than 21 workers.  The TUC’s approach therefore became one of 
broadly welcoming the FAW “agenda” and the introduction of ERA 1999, while campaigning 
for revised legislation that would fully address their most significant concerns.418 
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5.5  ERA 2004 and Issues of ‘Union Busting’ 
 
The Law Lords’ decision in Wilson and Palmer had prompted a series of applications to 
the ECtHR, claiming breaches in respect of Articles 10 (freedom of expression), 11 
(association) and 14 (discrimination) of the ECHR.419  In its judgement announced on 2 July 
2002, the ECtHR held that the effect of UK law was that employers could treat employees who 
chose not to surrender the right to consult a union less favorably than others who did.  Any 
attempt to so induce employees by means of financial incentives amounted to a frustration of 
a trade union’s ability to strive for the protection of its members interests and amounted to a 
violation of Article 11.  Keith Ewing suggested in 2003 that the overriding significance of 
Wilson and Palmer lies in ministers’ failure to address all of the pertinent issues that the cases 
raised for a full five years ahead of the ECtHR decision.420  ERA 1999 had dealt only with “one 
limb” of the Lords’ judgment because while it specified that protection against discrimination 
applied where the alleged detriment took the form of an act or an omission421, there was still 
no protection where the disadvantage complained of was connected to the use of trade union 
services.  Further, the Secretary of State’s power422 to make regulations to protect (against 
discrimination) workers whose terms and conditions were governed by a collective agreement 
had rendered itself ineffective for this purpose as no regulations had ever been made and 
because the section did not, in any event, apply in circumstances where a claim related to the 
payment of higher wages based upon performance of contractual services and not because of 
membership of a trade union.423   
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Ministers next started to contemplate how they might address some of the UK’s 
outstanding contraventions of international labour law standards including its supposed 
breaches of Article 11 of the ECHR.  The TUC’s initial declaration that ERA 1999 represented 
“a significant advance in trade union and workers’ rights” was now overtaken by a resolve to 
monitor its effects “post-implementation” together with lobbying for further advances.424  
Pessimists perhaps expected that ministers’ appetite for further legislation would be likely only 
to extend so far as would be necessary to address the matters specified in the ECtHR’s 
judgement in Wilson and Palmer, but ERA 2004 actually amended the recognition provisions 
contained in ERA 1999 in a number other respects, including: 
 clarification regarding the criteria to be used by the CAC to determine what might 
constitute an appropriate bargaining unit; 
 the creation of new rights for unions to communicate with workers within a proposed 
bargaining unit following acceptance of a recognition application; 
 the conferment of additional obligations on employers not to interfere with union 
meetings during the formal balloting period; 
 the introduction of further measures to prohibit employers and union from adopting 
unfair practices during the balloting period; 
 a declaration that provision of ‘pensions’ should not fall under the ambit of collective 
bargaining processes; 
 enhanced top-up arrangements where an existing (recognition) agreement does not 
cover pay, hours and holidays.425 
 
The new Act, inter alia, amended TULRCA 1992, section 146 to ensure that all 
“workers” would be afforded protection (including against dismissal) by the detriment 
provisions both with regard to any membership of a trade union that they held and as 
participants in “union activities”.426  Further, while ERA 1999 had provided that independent 
unions would be barred from submitting applications in circumstances where non-independent 
unions (typically staff associations) had already secured ‘voluntary’ recognition427, ERA 2004 
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introduced amendments which specified that an independent union could apply for de-
recognition of a non-independent “counterpart”428 suggesting that ministers’ were no longer so 
reluctant to interfere with the wishes of employees who had chosen to be represented by non-
independent unions.  Disappointingly for The TUC, its vociferous lobbying against any 
retention of the 40% ‘Yes’ vote requirement and the Small Business Exclusion proved 
unsuccessful and both measures continued to form a significant element of the ‘core’ of the 
UK’s statutory recognition scheme.  This debate nevertheless represented an acceptance by the 
union movement that the shift had been completed from the collective laissez-faire system that 
Kahn-Freund had envisaged to a process of legal recognition that they could seek to utilise in 
order to facilitate collective bargaining.  The shift in relations has not been structured in 
accordance with the defence of the public interest so desired by Kahn-Freund but has more 
been progressed through a reduction in unions’ traditional statutory immunities and a transfer 
of responsibility for the protection of employees’ rights from work-based collective 
organisation towards state-granted rights enforceable through the courts.  Thus, the trade union 
is no longer the source of the member’s right but it offers to defend it through support for legal 
action.  
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5.6 Comparing the UK and Australian Systems 
 
While the mechanics of the Australian system of recognition may appear to have been 
more straightforward than those of its UK counterpart, there now appear to be more similarities 
between them in terms of their characteristics, practical operation and effects.  The limited 
entrenched protection that exists in Australia in respect of workers’ human rights – including 
access to trade union representation and collective bargaining – is rooted in the country’s 
reliance on Commonwealth power to legislate with regard to corporations.  Federal and state 
legislatures promoted a model of conciliation and arbitration that gave greater prominence to 
individual tribunal awards and questioned the relevance of collective bargaining as the primary 
means through which to solve disputes.  The historical Australian approach that unions should 
simply be registered “centrally” in order that they can then participate in bargaining has not 
been replicated in the UK, which has traditionally favoured “voluntarism” in one form or 
another.  Both industrial relations systems have, however, relied more and more on “minimum 
floors of rights” that arguably favour individuals more than they encourage any kind of 
collective approach. 
 
Contemporary interest in any comparison of the two systems tends to focus more on the 
application of ‘Third Way’ philosophy and its emphasis on more local consent and participation 
in bargaining processes than the “centralised” processes favoured in the past.  The ideas that 
were first put into practice by the ALP governments in Australia from 1983 effectively became 
a blueprint for the FAW programme of legislation introduced in the UK by successive Labour 
administrations from 1999.  Fluctuations in union membership in both countries, due in part 
due to changes in economic trends and changes in the relative strengths of each of their 
manufacturing bases, have not always been reflected in the simultaneous electoral fortunes of 
their political parties either of the Left or the Right.  As the second Blair administration 
implemented its ERA 2004 founded in Third way thinking and to largely “complete” its 
programme of what it hoped would result in more “consensual” industrial relations reform, the 
Howard administration in Australia was introducing proposals that would lead to the 
introduction ‘WorkChoices’, which placed virtually complete emphasis on individual 
bargaining without collective representation and sought to severely curtail trade union activity.  
Chapter Five will review the nature of the UK’s model as it exists today and will include an 
expanded discussion of where it sits in relation to the post-WorkChoices Australian model.  
 
 
Summary 
 
“Voluntarism” and “partnership” were at the heart of proposals that were discussed in 
‘Fairness at Work’, introduced in ERA 1999 in the form of the Schedule A1 statutory 
recognition procedure and then consolidated in ERA 2004.  Schedule A1 itself represented an 
attempt by an incoming Labour government to establish a recognition scheme specifically 
designed to grant recognition for unions in any enterprise where a majority of employees 
favoured it, but which would in no way undermine the considerable effort that senior Party 
figures had expended “wooing” the business/employer lobby.  The response of ministers to this 
particular conundrum was to conclude that unions should adopt a particular industrial relations 
“function” within their business relationships. 
 
There were undoubtedly significant incentives within Schedule A1 for the parties to at 
least attempt to reach voluntary agreements, not least given the potential that existed for 
protracted disputes over (and eventual imposition of) recognition to sour any bargaining 
relationship that might ultimately be established.  Even “hostile” employers could reflect on 
the benefits of maximising control in the process (including the shaping of future bargaining 
processes) when the likely alternative would be to concede the eventual initiative to either the 
applicant trade union or to the CAC.  Dukes argues that Schedule A1 has placed too much 
emphasis on prioritisation of voluntary agreements as “a good in itself”, that this has 
represented a distraction from the more important prize of effective delivery of collective 
bargaining and that the promotion of such accords may also reflect a disregard for potential 
imbalances of power between the applicant union and the employer.  She questions whether a 
government pursuing this approach should ever be regarded as an impartial arbitrator capable 
of effecting a fair and proper ‘balance’ in the relationships that exist between employers and 
trade unions purporting to represent the interests of their workers.429  Similarly, Smith and 
Morton ponder that while the enactment of ERA 1999 could have heralded a “re-legitimisation 
of trade unionism”, including even “militant trade unionism”,430 it actually served as 
confirmation that the Labour Party had been “remade by means of accommodation with neo-
liberalism and modified acceptance of the Thatcherite landscape”.431  The retention of measures 
in respect of the outlawing of closed shops and secondary action, regarding picketing, ballots 
and notices, unofficial action, election of certain officials, the right of members in specified 
circumstances not to be disciplined by their union and the maintenance of the financial 
reporting rules and sanctions that the Conservatives had imposed on unions’ central 
bureaucracies saw the union movement in a relatively poor state of health as it entered the 
Schedule A1 “era”.  The institution of the ‘40% Yes’ threshold and SBE rendered unlikely real 
scope for unions to reap spectacular benefits from the introduction of statutory recognition and 
any increase in membership that did materialise was unlikely to be matched by workers’ 
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capacity to exert greater collective power on employers.  The purpose first of ERA 1999 and 
then of ERA 2004 could therefore be said simply to be one of “remoulding” the unions as 
“weaker partners” (sub-ordinates, in fact) in their relationships with employers432, resulting in 
the conclusion that the price paid for legitimisation (in the form of quite stringent regulation) 
was a heavy one that imposed greater restrictions on union activity than had been seen under 
the auspices of ‘collective laissez-faire’.  Statutory regulation has, then, become the main 
source of the UK’s union recognition law just as it has in respect of employment law more 
generally.  The status that the two ERAs have conferred on the CAC has diminished the 
influence of the courts and judiciary who have, for the most part, opted to refrain from 
intervening in recognition disputes and allow space for the CAC to reach decisions. 
  
                                                          
432 ibid. 
CHAPTER SIX 
  
THE UK AND AUSTRALIAN MODELS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Six will evaluate the cumulative effect of the UK’s trade union legislation 
(including the Blair governments’ two Employment Relations Acts) on unions’ ability to 
organise, recruit members and participate in collective bargaining.  It also assesses the extent 
to which legislation and case law has impacted upon employers’ attitudes and seeks to identify 
any “shortcomings” that may persist even following the procession of reform overseen by 
governments led by parties of Left and Right.  The “findings” that emerge from this analysis 
may assist in our understanding as to how, if at all, the introduction of a statutory recognition 
scheme in the form of the Schedule A1 scheme – and in particular the ‘Third Way’ approach 
to political discourse favoured by ‘New Labour’ politicians - can be said to have altered the 
“character” of the UK’s traditionally ‘collective laissez-faire’ (non-interventionist) model of 
trade union recognition.  A further point of interest within this discussion is whether the 
maintenance of the Small Business Exclusion within Schedule A1 gives rise to effects that 
reach beyond those enterprises and employees who are “caught” directly by it.   
 
The analysis contained in Chapter Six also includes further exploration and comparative 
analysis of the legal provision for recognition that exists in the UK and Australia.  The 
discussion will reach its conclusion in the identification of areas of apparent convergence and 
continuing divergence between the two regimes.  
  
 
6.1 The Respective Characters of the UK and Australian Recognition Models Today 
 
The analysis of the Australian model and the most recent legislative changes made in the 
UK that took place in Chapter Three and Chapter Four revealed the most noteworthy and 
significant features of the respective recognition mechanisms to be:  
Model/Jurisdiction Key Characteristics 
Australia  Recognition rights have been enshrined in law since the 
enactment of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
(‘Conciliation Act’) 1904 (Cth), which required unions 
to register as an organisation for the purposes of federal 
industrial relations legislation. 
 Traditionally impartial but firmly weighted towards 
employer interests following the introduction of WRA 
1996 and then WorkChoices from 2006. 
 Avoids ‘majoritarian’ support for collective bargaining 
as a pre-condition for recognition but, following 
introduction of FW Act 2009, notably endorses a 
“individualist” model of collective bargaining (talking 
about employers and employees and NOT unions), 
although some safeguards now exist to guarantee unions’ 
involvement in the bargaining process. 
UK  Historic “collective laissez-faire” (non-interventionist) 
approach favoured by successive governments until 
1980.   
 The emphasis has traditionally been on leaving 
employers and employees to reach voluntary agreements 
with recourse (now) to a statutory recognition procedure 
only where it proves impossible to reach a voluntary 
agreement. 
 Attempts have been made to introduce statutory 
recognition, culminating in the ‘social partnership 
model’ from 1999 onwards.  The statutory mechanisms 
that do exist with regard to unions are comparatively 
complex. 
 
There appears to be almost complete unanimity amongst academics that the UK Labour 
government’s purported “lack of bias” in the aftermath of its 1997 election victory more 
reflected a shift in prevailing attitudes towards fairness in employment relations than it did 
ministers’ intent to ensure that their new legislation would prove to be “even-handed”.433  The 
mechanisms for recognition that were contained in IRA 1971 and EPA 1975 were arguably 
founded upon a more traditional “pluralist conception” of collective representation and 
negotiation and an acceptance that the consequence of an expansion in collective bargaining 
might prove to be a more robust form of industrial relations regulation.   
 
The Schedule A1 procedure that ERA 1999 first inserted into TULRCA 1992 is 
symptomatic of a particular kind of Third Way approach.  It follows the simple hypothesis that 
“fairness” shall be determined by the free choice of the majority with provision for recognition 
being made only where a majority of the workforce wishes it all while striving to inform 
(arguably conflate) the institution of a new statutory provision with the long-established 
‘custom and practice’ that the parties should be free to “escape” down any voluntary route at 
any stage.  If Schedule A1’s motivation was to encourage settlement of recognition disputes 
by voluntary means alone, then the yardstick by which to judge the procedure must inevitably 
be the extent to which such conflicts have proved capable of being resolved without the need 
for a union to invoke the procedure, at least in any formal sense.  There certainly appears to be 
strong evidence that the enactment of ERA 1999 signified a change in mood and transformation 
of the atmosphere within which negotiations regarding recognition took place and there is little 
doubt that the “threat” (whether implicit or explicit) that a union might invoke the statutory 
procedure prompted many employers to opt for some form of accord with their employees and 
their unions  over the prospect that they might have recognition “imposed” on them by the 
state.434  The new statutory procedure did, the effects of the 40% ‘Yes’ vote requirement and 
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the Small Business Exclusion notwithstanding, afford trade unions a legal mechanism through 
which they could “forcibly” achieve their aim.  The most accurate measure of its effectiveness 
may, however, simply be the extent to which it yielded increased numbers of recognition 
agreements. 
 
Further legislative reform in the UK and Australia since the turn of the millennium has 
resulted in the two jurisdictions’ recognition models appearing to move closer together.  The 
UK model has, with its increased emphasis on ‘social partnership’ and the availability of a 
“statutory procedure of last resort”, evolved from a purer form of ‘collective laissez-faire’ to 
become a “collective laissez-faire hybrid”.  ‘Voluntarism’ and ‘partnership’, such as they exist, 
are driven by the statutory element that now forms the basis of the UK model, albeit there 
remains something of a “nullifying” effect with the SBE’s continued presence within the 
Schedule A1 scheme.  The intention of the FAW reforms may simply have been to instil 
“order” into the UK’s, at times, “chaotic” model with the aim of incentivising the parties but 
avoiding measures that might alter the fundamental balance of power within it?  The Australian 
industrial relations system, which was almost unique throughout most of the 20th century due 
to its ‘arbitral’ character (most developed nations had pursued models that could be said to 
have their foundations in ‘bargaining’) remains highly regulated.  FWA 2009 abolished the 
AWAs and restored at least some of the union rights that were so severely curtailed under 
WorkChoices.  Unlike its UK counterpart, the Australian model remains steadfastly “non-
majoritarian” in character.  The effect of the WRA 1996 and later ‘Workchoices’, both of which 
have been only partially tempered by the introduction of FWA 2009, has been to shift the 
emphasis of the Australian model to one that places far greater significance on individual 
choice.  Employers have been able to exert much more influence over regulation of their 
industrial relations (with their employees) and while FWA 2009 called time on the highly 
contentious AWAs that ‘WorkChoices’ established, a significant sustained and cumulative 
effect of the past two decades of legislation has been the replacement of former ‘compulsion’ 
with ‘voluntarism’ into the model at the enterprise bargaining level. 
 
 
6.1.1 Continuing Non-Compliance with ILO Conventions 
 
Chapter Four reflected on the antipathy shown by the ILO towards the raft of collective 
labour law introduced in the UK by Conservative administrations during the 1980s and 1990s 
as well as the FAW legislation introduced by Labour ministers elected from 1997 and whose 
efforts to ensure that UK law would conform to ILO standards appear to have been somewhat 
half-hearted, especially during their first term of office.  The first Blair government did restore 
the right to GCHQ employees to join their preferred union and new protections from dismissal 
for workers taking part in industrial action were also introduced but there was no excursion 
into other areas of contention such as the prohibition on secondary industrial action.  The effect 
of those decisions, especially when coupled with the institution of the Schedule A1 procedure, 
was that the Labour administration actually added to the already lengthy list of transgressions 
of ILO Conventions that had been promulgated by the post-1979 Conservative governments!435 
 
Smith and Morton admitted to some possibility that the introduction of ERA 1999 might 
help to “re-legitimise trade unionism” and possibly even “militant trade unionism” (as opposed 
to the re-casting of unions as “social partners” within enterprises), but believed that the sharp 
decrease in collective bargaining from 1980 actually rendered more certain scenarios within which 
employers would seek to contest applications for statutory recognition.436  A significant “hurdle” in 
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any discussion remains, of course, that the ILO is a voluntary organisation with only limited 
power to enforce its normative instruments in member states.  If its major levers are “moral 
persuasion” and “technical assistance” for the implementation of its labour standards, then it is 
perhaps no surprise that compliance will not be uniform, especially in a recession-hit but still 
globalised economy?  It is probably unwise though to underestimate the continuing influence 
of the ILO.  Smith and Morton certainly believed that the Blair-led Labour governments’ 
retention of so many of the measures introduced prior to 1997 was so grave that they no longer 
believed it appropriate to attach the ‘Conservative’ label to that raft of legislation simply 
because far too many inconsistencies remained with “the spirit and letter of the relevant 
conventions of the International Labour Organisation and other bodies.”437 
 
Similarly, while Australia’s enactment of FWA 2009 restored many rights that had been 
removed by ‘WorkChoices’, the International Trade Union Confederation reported that certain 
aspects of the right to join and form unions, to bargain collectively and to strike still failed to 
comply with the  requirements laid down in ILO Conventions 87 and 98.  It identified particular 
problems in the building and construction industry in the form of particular exemptions that 
continued to operate in breach of international standards on freedom of association and pointed 
too to the maintenance of a stipulation that workers could not take industrial action when 
bargaining with multiple employers unless they formed themselves into a single interest 
group.438 
 
 
6.1.2 ‘Excluding Small Businesses’ 
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 The TUC in the UK offered a cautious and qualified welcome to the introduction of ERA 
2004 in the same way that it had in the case of ERA 1999.439  It had been prepared, in the short-
term, to endure some of ERA 1999’s more “hostile” provisions such as the 40% ‘Yes’ vote 
requirement and the government’s insistence on the insertion of the SBE for firms employing 
fewer than 21 workers on the basis that the new Act represented welcome, if “incremental”, 
progress but their retention in ERA 2004 came as a severe disappointment.440  Presented as a 
measure to exempt small businesses generally from “unnecessary ‘red tape’/regulation, the 
SBE represented arguably the starkest example of Labour ministers’ attempts to secure more 
widespread acceptance of their ‘Fairness at Work’-inspired raft of legislation.  The Australian 
federal governments led by John Howard and Rudd refrained from introducing similar 
measures into the Australian industrial relations system, at least in any kind of “overt” sense, 
but it remains an obvious measure that could be adopted by a future administration.   
 
Alan Bogg predicted back in 2005 that the UK government’s decision to retain its SBE 
is likely to prove far more significant in the longer term than the introduction of other 
amendments that were received more warmly by the trade union lobby.441  The then General 
Secretary of the TUC, Brendan Barber, acknowledged in 2003 (while final drafts of ERA 2004 
were being prepared)  that his organisation had previously offered a “warm welcome” to the 
generality of the proposals first tabled under ‘FAW’ umbrella.  This had, however, been 
“tempered by one stark omission” in the form of the SBE.  Dissenting from the government’s 
declaration that its statutory scheme was a product of some kind of “accord” between the 
employer and employee lobbies, Barber maintained that retention of the SBE merely served to 
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deny approximately six million people rights that were being enjoyed by their compatriots 
working in larger concerns.  It was, both in principle and in practice, “arbitrary and unfair” and 
undermined the spirit of ministers’ stated commitment that they would ensure “fairness at 
work”.  The TUC vowed that it would “defeat the arguments of the small firms lobby” and 
persuade the government both that the SBE’s continued existence represented an infringement 
of the democratic rights of any employees who were unfortunate enough to work in qualifying 
(small) enterprises and that its abolition would not, in any case, harm any small business.442 
 
There is no doubt that the SBE was intended to a compromise (some might suggest it 
represented little more than a “fudge”) solution that was borne out of ministers’ desire for 
political “consensus” that they hoped would deliver enduring harmony in UK industrial 
relations and perhaps even lay memories of the fabled ‘Winter of Discontent’ during the tenure 
of the previous Labour government to rest.  Economic considerations did not appear to play 
any part in the formulation of the Schedule A1 procedure save, perhaps, for the government’s 
apparent acceptance of the argument that absence of a SBE would result in a heavy cost burden 
to smaller enterprises.  For some, the ‘Third Way’ and “compromise” are inextricably linked 
even if the FAW programme of legislation was arguably only a product of the first Blair 
government’s “take” on previous Third Way thinking.  The SBE effectively validates the 
suggestion that trade union activity can be said to be undesirable (either in principle or effect), 
at least in certain circumstances.  It is no wonder then that the TUC has opposed the SBE 
vigorously ever since its inception.  Welcome as the other provisions contained in the Schedule 
A1 scheme may be, the enduring effect of the SBE may simply be to undermine any effort by 
the union movement to more broadly put its case and expand its operations.  Bogg has, more 
recently, argued recently that the Schedule A1 scheme represents just the most recent 
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manifestation of a drawn-out and highly unproductive “Wagner-inspired debate”443 that has 
seen successive UK governments obsess over “worker choice” and the “hows, whys and 
wherefores of (their) consent”.  Bound up in procedure and shaped entirely by considerations 
of ‘voluntarism’, he concluded in an article published in 2012 that UK statutory recognition 
was “dying”, a mere 15 years after the introduction of the Schedule A1 scheme.444 
 
 
6.1.3 UK ‘Coalition’ and Conservative Governments from 2010 
 
Hepple argues that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government (formed 
following the 2010 General Election) settled on an approach to employment law that effectively 
saw its members adhere to a policy borne out of competing tensions of “social liberalism and 
market fundamentalism but wrapped in the language of ‘fairness’”, resulting in “continuity 
with… (a) ‘Third Way’ of ‘regulating for competitiveness’ and social inclusion” on the one 
hand, but pursuance of its “Red Tape Challenge… leading to the abolition or scaling down of 
employment and equality rights” on the other.445  Gall suggests that this apparent endorsement 
of the Blair (and Brown) Labour governments’ policy of industrial partnership and lack of any 
substantive “proposals to modify the highly complex ‘red tape’ of (Labour’s) weak trade union 
recognition procedures”446 is most likely founded on an absence of any discernable pressure 
for change from employers pacified by what he sees as the declining effectiveness of the 
procedures introduced in ERA 1999 and ERA 2004.447  Opponents of unions have claimed 
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repeatedly for several years now that they wield disproportionate influence in the public sector 
and that they lack relevance in the private sector.448  The majority Conservative government 
elected in May 2015 has, at least for now, also resisted any temptation to seek to curtail union 
influence through reform of the Schedule A1 scheme.  It has instead pledged that it will 
introduce legislation designed to severely restrict union members’ ability to take lawful strike 
action.449  This presents yet another challenge to trade unionists as they strive to demonstrate 
their worth not only to their members (and potential recruits) but to their employers too. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The UK TUC reported in April 2006 that the significant and continuing expansion in 
recognition campaigning had, nevertheless, been met by a marked decrease in the number of 
agreements that unions had found themselves able to conclude with employers.450  There might 
be a number explanations for this phenomenon including the possibility of a sense on the part 
of at least some employers that, once implemented, ERA 1999 and ERA 2004 more or less (i.e. 
questions of recognition apart) preserved the kind of “restrictive” regime of trade union law 
that they had become so accustomed to over the previous two decades?  The suggestion that 
the introduction of statutory recognition in the form of the Schedule A1 procedure could result 
in a wider overhaul (expansion) in collective bargaining451 has been rejected by the likes of 
Smith and Morton, who argue that the union movement’s condition was already such that it 
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was unlikely to reap significant benefits from the introduction of statutory recognition and 
argue instead that the purpose of ERA 1999 and ERA 2004 was simply to “remould” unions 
as “weaker partners” in relationships with employers.452   
 
Bogg has tempered his declaration that the advent of ERA 2004 did “not disclose a 
collectivist turn in (the) second phase of New Labour's collective labour law reforms” with an 
acknowledgement that it did at least contain “significant new measures in relation to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining rights.”453  His most significant contention remains, 
however, that it is the retention of the Small Business Exclusion within the Schedule A1 
scheme that is likely to be most long-lasting (and far-reaching) in its effect.  The passage of 
time between ERA 1999 and ERA 2004 was, of course, relatively short.  Ministers’ original 
decision to confine requests for statutory recognition to enterprises comprising fewer than 21 
employees followed concerted lobbying by Conservative Party politicians and employers’ 
groups for a much higher figure.  It may appear somewhat ironic though that the UK political 
party that was founded by trade unions should, arguably, shoulder much of the responsibility 
for putting in place - largely through the introduction of the small business exclusion contained 
within the Schedule A1 procedure - significant barriers to the expansion of membership in 
private sector industries.  The scope and effect of the SBE within the UK statutory recognition 
scheme and/or the “business-friendly methodology conceived in FAW to help devise the limits 
of proposed bargaining units could conceivably constitute sufficient subject matter sufficient 
to justify an entirely separate study as could the extent to which unions both in Australia (by 
virtue of their registration as ‘corporate entities’) and the UK (through the raft of 1980s 
Conservative legislation that was left largely intact by the FAW reforms) have seen state-
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sponsored scrutiny and regulation of their internal affairs become intertwined with their ability 
to obtain recognition and participate in collective bargaining. 
 
Australian federal and state industrial legislation bestows rights on trade unions on the 
one hand but these are then “tempered” by strict scrutiny of organisations’ internal rules and 
processes and their finances.  The Australian model has evolved however from one in which 
State arbitration authorities proved pivotal in the resolution of disputes between parties and the 
setting of standards in working conditions (through the system of awards that could be applied 
either to specific enterprises or across entire industries) to a system that remains founded in 
registration but which has been decentralised so that it concentrates much more on individual 
“employers and employees”.  Australian trade unions are treated as “parties principal” with a 
legal identity separate and distinct from their members.  They are able to effectively “police” 
industries and occupations and can take action in support of their objectives that may not 
necessarily be consistent with the views of their members. 
 
Australian trade unions continue, because of the status afforded to them upon registration, 
to remain integral to the industrial relations system.  The Australian model of recognition by 
virtue of registration thereby provides a unique point of contrast to the more limited model of 
recognition introduced in the UK in ERA 1999.  By ensuring that recognition flows 
automatically from participation in the conciliation and arbitration system the Australian model 
avoids the complications and limitations that arise under the British system, which requires 
minimum membership levels, secret recognition ballots and the involvement of both the 
employer and the Central Arbitration Committee in the recognition process.      
 
The influence and power – and memberships - of UK trade unions have all been steadily 
in decline since the early 1980s.  The legislation that the Thatcher (Conservative) governments 
in particular introduced to remove many trade union rights and immunities has, over time, been 
supplemented by increased emphasis on the quantity and scope of individual employment 
rights, which raises inevitable questions regarding the perceived relevance of trade union 
membership for many members of the workforce.  The introduction of a scheme (Schedule A1) 
for statutory recognition by the first Blair (Labour) government was arguably designed to help 
extend the reach (if not the power) of trade union influence, but UK trade union membership 
has continued to decline in both the public and (especially) the private sector.  The general 
trend in both Australian and the UK has been to place far more prominence on the grant of 
individual (rather than collective) workplace rights and this continues to present stiff challenges 
to their respective trade union lobbies (the ACTU and TUC) as they seek to convince 
employees of their relevance into the 21st century and their respective governments that access 
to trade unions should be available on the basis of “rights” and not facilitated through the kind 
of business efficiency that employers in either model may demand.  
 
UK trade unions’ concerns regarding the Blair governments’ inability to effect a 
restoration of pre-1979 trade union powers and the immunities for secondary industrial action 
apart454, those administrations’ commitment to ‘Third Way’ thinking plainly did impact upon 
the UK’s model of recognition, altering it to an updated – but now significantly distorted – 
form of the ‘collective laissez-faire’ pioneered by Kahn-Freund six decades earlier.  The 
Conservatives’ victory in the 2015 UK general election may threaten the “stability” that has 
been inherent in the UK model since full implementation of ERA 2004 in April 2005.  Similarly 
(if not necessarily identically), a further Liberal/National general election victory in Australia 
during 2016 could herald some kind of re-consideration of the themes explored previously in 
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WorkChoices.  These remain, however, points of conjecture.  For now, the UK model has 
evolved to a position where “legal” union recognition has become increasingly important 
coincidental with its diminished role in Australia.  The respective histories and characters of 
the respective systems as they entered the 2000s were however such that it cannot be said that 
the direction of travel in either model could simply be said to have been opposite to that in the 
other.    
 
There is no doubt that post-1999 reforms introduced in the UK have enshrined a presence 
for trade unions within the industrial relations model.  What would not appear to have been 
settled is the precise role (or function) that they may be expected to fulfil in different sets of 
circumstances?  Both major political parties’ increased emphasis on the maintenance of 
individual employment entitlements protected  by law appears to undermine the very essence 
of collectivism and employee organisation in workplaces.  Third Way/’New Labour’ 
proponents of ‘social partnership’, who appear (certainly at the outset) to have envisaged a 
specific (some might say “diluted”) function for trade unions - and a particular kind of 
relationship that they hoped might evolve between them and their members might, of course, 
argue that the two are not mutually exclusive?  An obvious argument that may be advanced is 
that the now evident concentration on advances in individual employment protections has 
served to render trade union membership and organisation obsolescent.  An effective counter-
argument to this might be that putting the continued slow decline in trade union membership 
bases on one side, many employers continue to prefer to engage with their representatives for 
bargaining purposes.  Particular, now long-established provisions such as the statutory right of 
the individual to be accompanied to a grievance or disciplinary meeting by “a trade union 
official” 455 rely on and are founded in an acceptance of the trade union presence and it may 
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also be argued that while support for (and participation in) trade unions may continue to 
fluctuate over time.  Demands for (and pressures on) workers to embrace “flexibility” in 
employment notwithstanding the now more regimented post-Kahn-Freund model that exists 
does at least afford those who seek to promote worker freedom of association a practical means 
of survival and potentially even a platform from which they might hope to re-grow their scope 
one day. 
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